Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate by Roin, Benjamin N.
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 999 2014 
Provided by: 
The University of Chicago D'Angelo Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Feb  2 13:08:38 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0041-9494
Intellectual Property versus Prizes:
Refraining the Debate
Benjamin N. Roint
The academic literature on the prize system describes prizes as a radical
alternative to intellectual property. The debate over which system is preferable has
existed for centuries and usually boils down to a single question: Can the govern-
ment determine the appropriate reward for innovations without relying on intellec-
tual property rights to reveal their value to consumers? If yes, scholars assume that
prizes are superior because they avoid deadweight loss and provide equal or better
incentives for innovation. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the na-
ture of intellectual property rights. It equates intellectual property with uniform
monopoly pricing and monopoly profits, while depicting the prize system as the
only effective strategy to achieve efficient consumer pricing and government control
over rewards. In reality, intellectual property merely provides a right to exclude
others from the market. Governments can and often do institute policies that
resemble prize systems-in both their structure and objectives-alongside intellec-
tual property systems. Governments use subsidies (and sometimes price controls) to
push consumer prices closer to marginal cost and adjust the incentives for inno-
vation. Given these other policy levers available within an intellectual property re-
gime, the existing prize literature has exaggerated and misconceived the differences
between the two systems. Under many circumstances, the prize system has no ad-
vantage over intellectual property in terms of avoiding deadweight loss. Moreover,
intellectual property will frequently offer superior incentives to prizes-irrespective
of whether it is used to measure an invention's value to consumers-because it pro-
vides an ongoing check against expropriation, thereby permitting renegotiation of
rewards over time to reflect changing estimations of an invention's social value.
Contrary to the long-standing framework used to compare the two systems, intel-
lectual property may be superior to prizes even when the government can determine
the appropriate reward for innovations.
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INTRODUCTION
The intellectual property system is a central component of
innovation policy, but it has always been controversial.1 The
system is designed to encourage innovation by offering a tempo-
rary monopoly right over inventions or works of authorship
(hereinafter "inventions").2 However, the benefits from promot-
ing innovation through intellectual property rights are at least
partially offset by the deadweight loss from allowing innovators
to charge monopoly prices for their inventions. 3 Moreover, the
allure of monopoly profits offers imperfect incentives for innova-
tion, providing inadequate rewards for many socially valuable
inventions 4 while overrewarding some socially wasteful inven-
tions.5 A "growing number" of academics have concluded that
the government could correct those problems by replacing some
or all of the intellectual property system with prizes.6 These
scholars argue that the government should award monetary
prizes instead of intellectual property rights7 for inventions and
1 See Adam B. Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our
Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do about It
79-95 (Princeton 2004); Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 899,
922-48 (2002); Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nine-
teenth Century, 10 J Econ Hist 1, 15-16 (1950).
2 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
3 See F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 379-
99 (Rand McNally 1970) (discussing the classical economic analysis of the patent sys-
tem); Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 137-66 (Harvard 2004).
4 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in National Bureau of Economic Research, ed, The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 617, 619 (Princeton 1962).
5 See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 399-400 (MIT 1988).
6 Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L Rev 970, 976 n 19 (2012).
7 While the theoretical literature almost always depicts prize systems as an alter-
native to intellectual property, there are very few historical or present-day examples of
prizes offered as a replacement for intellectual property rights, See generally Knowledge
Ecology International, Selected Innovation Prizes and Reward Programs (2008), online at
http:/lwww.keionline.org/misc-docs/research-notes/kei_rn_2008l.pdf (visited Aug 12,
2014) (listing a few examples of such systems). The vast majority of prizes have been
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propose systems in which the government determines the prize
payouts for inventions ex post (that is, after their development)8
based on an estimate of each invention's social value.9 According
to most prize advocates, this approach would avoid the
deadweight loss associated with intellectual property and provide
used as a supplement to intellectual property. See Liam Brunt, Josh Lerner, and Tom
Nicholas, Inducement Prizes and Innovation, 60 J Indust Econ 657, 659 (2012) (examining
the use of prizes by the Royal Agricultural Society of England from 1839 to 1939); Deborah
D. Stine, Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes *3-17 (Congressional Re-
search Service June 29, 2009), online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40677.pdf (visited
Aug 12, 2014) (detailing various prizes offered by the federal government to promote
particular innovations).
8 See Julien Penin, Patents versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look, 34 Rsrch Pol
641, 644 (2005) (reviewing the literature on proposals for ex post prize systems and pa-
tent buyouts). The government could set prize payouts ex ante rather than ex post, offer-
ing a specific monetary reward to anyone who solves a particular problem in a manner
satisfying certain predetermined conditions. See Lee Davis and Jerome Davis, Prizes as
Incentives: Reflections on a Century of Aviation Contests, in Jon Sundbo, et al, eds, Con-
temporary Management of Innovation: Are We Asking the Right Questions?, 230, 230-47
(Palgrave Macmillan 2006); Thomas Kalil, Prizes for Technological Innovation *18-19
(Brookings Institution Discussion Paper 2006-08, Dec 2006), online at http://www
.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads-and_links/Prizes-for Technological-Innovation.pdf
(visited Aug 12, 2014). Ex ante prizes might seem superior to ex post prizes because, as-
suming that the government's commitment to pay is credible, ex ante prizes avoid the
potential in terrorem effect of setting prizes when the innovator's costs are already sunk.
However, ex ante prizes are not a broad substitute for intellectual property rights be-
cause, in many cases, the government has trouble foreseeing socially valuable inventions
prior to their development and thus cannot post their prize payout ex ante:
[G]overnments often will be less likely than private investors to know of the ex-
istence of possible creations or inventions, much less of their value ... [tihe
key insight [for prize advocates] is that the size of a prize need not be estab-
lished ex ante. It can also be determined ex post-when there is better and
more widely distributed information about value.
Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 986 (cited in note 6). See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic
Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 Duke L J 1693, 1724 (2008). Indeed, ex
ante prizes can be extremely challenging to establish and administer, since the govern-
ment must specify ahead of time the precise performance standards necessary for inven-
tions to win the prize. As Professor Fiona Murray and her coauthors explain, specifying
the criteria for winning a prize "is not nearly as clear or simple as either theorists or ad-
vocates have assumed," since "multiple dimensions of performance [must] be assessed"
and "[slome of these dimensions can neither be quantified nor anticipated, while others
may change as the competition unfolds." Fiona Murray, et al, Grand Innovation Prizes: A
Theoretical, Normative, and Empirical Evaluation, 41 Rsrch Pol 1779, 1791 (2012). This
same problem frequently plagues R & D contract bidding in the defense department. See
John A. Alic, Trillions for Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates and Why It
Costs So Much 69-70, 102-08 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007).
9 Governments could attempt to link prize payouts to each invention's total R & D
costs instead of its social value, but prize advocates generally assume that the govern-
ment has better information about inventions' social value than about their R & D costs. See
Stephen M. Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, 15 Adv Stud Entrepre-
neurship, Innovation & Econ Growth 1, 5 (2004).
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superior incentives for innovation.10 But many scholars argue ve-
hemently against such proposals, usually on the ground that the
government would likely mismanage the prize payouts, jeopard-
izing the incentives for innovation."
This debate dates back to at least the nineteenth century12
and may be "as old as the patent system" itself.13 However, the
past two decades have seen a virtual explosion of scholarship on
prize systems, 4 particularly within the economic 15 and legal
10 See, for example, Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intel-
lectual Property Rights, 44 J L & Econ 525, 544-45 (2001) (arguing that an optional-prize
system is superior to intellectual property rights); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A
Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q J Econ 1137, 1146-48 (1998) (proposing a
patent buyout regime for pharmaceutical patents).
11 See, for example, Joseph A. DiMasi and Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and R&D
Incentives: Comments on the Hubbard and Love Trade Framework for Financing Phar-
maceutical R&D *11-13 (2004), online at http://who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en
Submission3.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Proprietary
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 Minn L Rev 697, 705-17 (2001); National Re-
search Council, Innovation Inducement Prizes at the National Science Foundation 33
(National Academies 2007) ("The [NSF] committee counsels against any requirement
that the winner [of an innovation-inducement prize] make the intellectual property un-
derlying the winning innovation available to the world at no cost or on concessional
terms.").
12 See Machlup and Penrose, 10 J Econ Hist at 19 (cited in note 1).
13 Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No 15, Sub-
committee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 1, 15 (1958). See also Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for
Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?, 18 Harv J L & Tech 85, 95-96
(2004) (citing various champions of proposals to replace patents with prizes, dating as far
back as 1660); Janis, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 899 (cited in note 1); Machlup and Penrose,
10 J Econ Hist at 19 (cited in note 1); Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revo-
lution: The English Patent System, 1660-1800 182-200 (Cambridge 1988).
14 See Daniel J. Hemel and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes
Debate, 92 Tex L Rev 303, 305 (2013) ("In recent years, articles comparing the relative
merits of patents, prizes, and grants have consumed thousands of pages in law reviews
and economics journals."); Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excluda-
bility and the Limits of Patents, 122 Yale L J 1900, 1912 n 38, 1954-56 & nn 172-80
(2013) (compiling a list of sources reflecting the "resurgence of interest recently in com-
parative analysis of patents and innovation policy alternatives"). Compare Shavell and
van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 528 (cited in note 10) (noting that in the "[m]odern eco-
nomic literature" as of 2001, "the possibility of rewards is paid relatively little atten-
tion"), with Knowledge Ecology International, Scholarly and Technical Articles and
Books on Innovation Prizes, online at http://www.keionline.org/content/view/82/1 (visited
Aug 12, 2014) (listing more than fifty articles and books about prizes published after
2001).
15 See, for example, Davis and Davis, Prizes as Incentives at 230 (cited in note 8);
Eric A.A. de Laat, Patents or Prizes: Monopolistic R&D and Asymmetric Information, 15
Intl J Indust Org 369, 370 (1996); Earl L. Grinols and James W. Henderson, Replace
Pharmaceutical Patents Now, 25 Pharmacoeconomics 355, 357 (2007); Robert C. Guell
and Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry,
73 Milbank Q 213, 220-25 (1995); Hugo Hopenhayn, Gerard Llobet, and Matthew Mitchell,
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literatures 16 on intellectual property, but also in political philo-
sophy17 and public health.a Some of this literature is largely
Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts, 114 J Polit Econ 1041,
1042-45 (2006); William A. Masters, Research Prizes: A Mechanism to Reward Agricul-
tural Innovation in Low-Income Regions, 6 AgBioForum 71, 72-73 (2003); Paul Romer,
When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?, 92 Am Econ Rev 213, 216 (2002);
Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 41-46 (MIT 2004); Shavell, Foundations
at 161-66 (cited in note 3); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1719-21 (cited in note 8); Burton A.
Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, Wash Post A21 (Aug 22, 2003); Nancy Gallini and
Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in Adam
B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds, 2 Innovation Policy and the Economy 51, 54
(MIT 2002). See also generally Brunt, Lerner, and Nicholas, 60 J Indust Econ 657 (cited
in note 7); V.V. Chari, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski, Prizes and Patents: Using
Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Innovations, 147 J Econ Theory 781 (2012); J.A.
DiMasi and H.G. Grabowski, Should the Patent System for New Medicines Be Abol-
ished?, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 488 (2007); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient
Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation (unpublished draft, June 10, 2004),
online at http://www.who.intlintellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf (vis-
ited Aug 12, 2014); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ 1137 (cited in note 10); Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol
641 (cited in note 8); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ 525 (cited in note 10). Of
course, the idea of prizes is not new to economics. See Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform,
11 Rev Econ Stud 61, 64-65 (1944) (arguing that the patent system should be replaced
with a prize regime); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents,
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 Am Econ Rev 691, 696-700 (1983).
16 See, for example, Jordan Barry, When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent's
Poor Secondary Incentives through an Optional Patent Purchase System, 2007 Wis L Rev
585, 590-95; Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information:
Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and
the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 Fordham IP Media & Ent L J
301, 342-44 (1998); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Proper-
ty, 71 U Chi L Rev 37, 49-51 (2004); William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innova-
tion: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical Perspectives *2-3 (unpublished essay, Pro-
gramme Seminar on Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, May 2001), online at http:/cyber.law.harvard.edulpeople/tfisher/Innovation
.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014); Eckersley, 18 Harv J L & Tech at 106-11 (cited in note 13);
William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertain-
ment 199-258 (Stanford 2004); Janis, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 939-42 (cited in note 1);
Amy Kapczynski, Commentary: Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J L Med & Ethics
264, 265-66 (2009); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 Emory
L J 327, 403-04 (2006); Kieff, 85 Minn L Rev at 705-17 (cited in note 11); Saul Levmore,
The Impending iPrize Revolution in Intellectual Property Law, 93 BU L Rev 139, 151-58
(2013); Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 Hastings Comm & Ent L J 1, 41-45
(2004); James Love and Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New
Medicines, 82 Chi Kent L Rev 1519, 1534-43 (2007); Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting
Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent
Rewards, 24 Temple J Sci Tech & Envir L 51, 64-69 (2005); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of In-
tellectual Property: Health as a Case Study, 70 L & Contemp Probs 125, 128-30 (2007); Peter
K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U Colo L Rev 653, 734-35 (2005). See
also generally, Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand L Rev 115 (2003);
William Fisher and Talha Syed, Chapter 7: Prizes (unpublished draft, Feb 24, 2012),
online at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/DrugsChapter7.pdf (visited Aug 12,
2014); Marhi Kim and Bryan Schwartz, Economic Prizes: A New Model for Pharmaceutical
Intellectual Property versus Prizes
theoretical, but much of it discusses relatively specific proposals
to replace intellectual property with prizes in particular fields.
The majority of these discussions are about whether to finance
pharmaceutical innovation through a prize system rather than
through patents.19 There are also proposals to eliminate copy-
rights on music, movies, and books in favor of prizes,20 as well as
Innovations, 6 Asper Rev Intl Bus & Trade L 1 (2006); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing
Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals,
11 Harv J L & Tech 123 (1997); Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease
Innovations for Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 32 Am J L & Med 159 (2006); Talha
Syed, Should a Prize System for Pharmaceuticals Require Patent Protection for Eligibility?
(IGH Discussion Paper No 2, June 10, 2009), online at http://www.healthimpactfund
.com/files/DP2 Syed.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014); Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace
Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, 13 BU J Sci & Tech L 25
(2007).
17 See, for example, Thomas Pogge, Medicines for the World: Boosting Innovation
without Obstructing Free Access, in Thomas Pogge and Michael J. Selgelid, eds, Health
Rights 315, 328-35 (Ashgate 2010); Michael J. Selgelid, A Full-Pull Program for the Pro-
vision of Pharmaceuticals: Practical Issues, 1 Pub Health Ethics 134, 134-36 (2008).
18 See, for example, E. Richard Gold, et al, Are Patents Impeding Medical Care and
Innovation?, 7 PLoS Med 1, 2 (2009); Alan Lyles, Creating Alternative Incentives for
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 28 Clinical Therapeutics 126, 126-27 (2006); Carl Nathan,
Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need, 13 Nature Med 304, 306 (2007).
19 See generally, for example, Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev 115 (cited in note 16);
Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues? (Issue Brief, Center for
Economic and Policy Research, Sept 22, 2004), online at http://www.cepr.net/
documents/publications/intellectuaLproperty_2004_09.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014); Barry,
2007 Wis L Rev at 638-40 (cited in note 16); DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Phar-
macology & Therapeutics 488 (cited in note 15); Fisher and Syed, Prizes (cited in note
16); Gold, et al, 7 PLoS Med 1 (cited at note 18); Grinols and Henderson, 25 Pharmaco-
economics 355 (cited in note 15); Guell and Fischbaum, 73 Milbank Q 213 (cited in note
15); Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation (cited in note 15);
Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Acces-
sible for All (Global Health 2008); Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev 970 (cited in note 6);
Kapczynski, 37 J L Med & Ethics 264 (cited in note 16); Kim and Schwartz, 6 Asper Rev
Intl Bus & Trade L 1 (cited in note 16); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ 1137 (cited in note 10);
Levmore, 93 BU L Rev 139 (cited in note 16); Lichtman, 11 Harv J L & Tech 123 (cited in
note 16); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev 1519 (cited in note 16); James Love and
Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 Annals Health L
155 (2009); Lyles, 28 Clinical Therapeutics 126 (cited in note 18); Nathan, 13 Nature
Med 304 (cited in note 18); Outterson, 32 Am J L & Med 159 (cited in note 16); Rai, 70 L
& Contemp Probs 125 (cited in note 16); Selgelid, 1 Pub Health Ethics 134 (cited in note
17); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J 1692 (cited in note 8); Syed, Should a Prize System for Phar-
maceuticals Require Patent Protection for Eligibility? (cited in note 16); Weisbrod, Solving
the Drug Dilemma, Wash Post A21 (cited in note 15).
20 See, for example, Michael Abramowicz, Copyrighted Works as Public Goods (IP-
Central Rev, 2004) (on file with author); Eckersley, 18 Harv J L & Tech at 97-100 (cited
in note 13); Fisher, Promises to Keep at 199-258 (cited in note 16); Levmore, 93 BU L
Rev at 158-61 (cited in note 16); Litman, 27 Hastings Comm & Ent L J at 41-45 (cited in
note 16); Romer, 92 Am Econ Rev at 216 (cited in note 15); Yu, 76 U Colo L Rev at 739-
44 (cited in note 16); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U Chi L Rev 263, 312-15 (2002)
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proposals to use prizes instead of patents to spur innovation in
clean energy. 21
This literature almost invariably describes the prize system
as a dramatic departure from an intellectual property regime.22
Professors Terry Fisher and Talha Syed characterize prizes as a
"radically different approach" to promoting innovation with
monopoly rights.23 Professor Steven Shavell states that the prize
system "provides a fundamental alternative to property rights in
information.24 Professor Michael Abramowicz describes prize
proposals as a "challenge [to] the foundations of intellectual
property law."25 Professor Amy Kapczynski argues that the
(proposing "[sitatutory levies ... on subscriptions for Internet service and the sales of
computer, audio, and video equipment" to "provide a source of revenue for musicians and
songwriters instead of copyright"); Glynn S. Lunney Jr, The Death of Copyright: Digital
Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 Va L Rev
813, 852-53, 911-12 (2001) (offering a qualified endorsement of plans "to authorize pri-
vate copying while attempting to compensate copyright owners by collecting levies on
sales of the equipment and blank storage media that enable such copying"); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17
Harv J L & Tech 1, 35 (2003) (proposing a "Noncommercial Use Levy" for "allowing un-
hindered P2P file swapping while compensating copyright holders with proceeds of some
sort of compulsory license or levy"); Mark A. Lemley and R. Anthony Reese, Reducing
Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan L Rev 1345, 1406-
10 (2004) (discussing some of the pros and cons of a 'levy" system for financing innovation).
21 See, for example, Bronwyn H. Hall and Christian Helmers, Innovation and Dif-
fusion of Clean/Green Technology: Can Patent Commons Help?, 66 J Envir Econ &
Mgmt 33, 33-34 (2013); Chris Israel, A Survey of the Global Policy Landscape for Green
Technology and Intellectual Property *22 (Institute for Policy Innovation Policy Report
193, Apr 2011), online at http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120106Green-Tech.pdf (visited
Aug 12, 2014); Jerome Reichman, et al, Intellectual Property and Alternatives: Strategies
for Green Innovation *21-22 (Energy, Environment and Development Programme Paper,
Chatham House, Dec 2008), online at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=2915&context=faculty-scholarship (visited Aug 12, 2014); Jonathan H. Adler,
Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization,
35 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 12-19 (2011) (discussing the use of prizes as a supplement to in-
tellectual property to promote green technology).
22 For example, James Love and Tim Hubbard characterize proposals to replace
drug patents with prizes as "The Big Idea." Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at
1519 (cited in note 16). And in the popular press, the titles of articles discussing prize
proposals commonly contain the word "radical." See, for example, Brian Vastag, 'Radical'
Bill Seeks to Reduce Costs of AIDS Drugs by Awarding Prizes Instead of Patents (Wash
Post May 19, 2012), online at http://www.washingtonpost'com/national/health-science/
radical-bill-seeks-to-reduce-cost-of-aids-drugs-by-awarding-prizes-instead-of-patents
2012/05/19/gIQAEGfabUstory.html (visited Aug 12, 2014); John Simons, A Radical
Plan to Lower Drug Costs, Fortune (Nov 30, 2007), online at http://archive.fortune.corml
2007/11/28/magazines/fortune/simons-patent.fortuneindex.htm?postversion=2007113004
(visited Aug 12, 2014).
23 Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *42 (cited in note 16).
24 Shavell, Foundations at 161 (cited in note 3).
25 Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 119 (cited in note 16).
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renewed interest in prizes is (or should be) forcing intellectual
property scholars "to telescope out from a singular focus on IP as
the privileged way to promote scientific and cultural production,"
showing that "we should rethink the contours of the field of Ip."26
This Article does not take a side in the debate whether to
replace intellectual property with prizes. Rather, it challenges
the literature's depiction of the prize system as a radical alter-
native to intellectual property. This Article will show that the
basic theoretical framework that scholars use to compare intel-
lectual property to prizes is based on a fundamental misunder-
standing of intellectual property rights. As a result of this error,
the literature focuses on purported differences between the two
systems that are either illusory or greatly exaggerated, and it
overlooks other differences with important policy implications.
The literature comparing intellectual property to prizes tradi-
tionally framed the comparison as a choice between the benefits
of market-based incentives for innovation under an intellectual
property system and the benefits of competitive consumer pricing
under a prize system. 27 Since the prize system eliminates the
temporary monopoly rights provided by intellectual property, the
literature predicts that the prize system would increase compe-
tition in the market for inventions and thus move prices closer
to marginal cost.28 Consequently, the literature largely takes for
26 Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 979, 1026 (cited in note 6).
27 See, for example, Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 55 (cited in note
15); Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 704 (cited in note 15) (noting that the choice between
intellectual property and prizes "rests on the tradeoff between the excess burden of the
patent system and its informational advantage over prizes").
28 See Baker, Financing Drug Research at *17 (cited in note 19) ("The key feature
that all four of these [prize] proposals have in common is that they largely eliminate the
gap between price and marginal cost that is created by the current patent system.");
Calandrillo, 9 Fordham IP Media & Ent L J at 326-28, 336-37 (cited in note 16) ("Once
the award is given, the innovation falls into the public domain such that it can be repro-
duced without penalty and distributed to all those whose willingness to pay is equal to or
exceeds the marginal cost of production."); Chari, Golosov, and Tsyvinski, 147 J Econ
Theory at 782 (cited in note 15) ("Prizes reward innovators while making the fruits of the
innovation public. Competitive markets then produce an efficient number of units of the
good or exploit the idea associated with the innovation as efficiently as possibl[e].");
Patricia M. Danzon and Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Recon-
ciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 Intl J Health Care Fin & Econ 183, 185 (2003); Kremer,
113 Q J Econ at 1148 (cited in note 10) ("Deadweight losses due to monopoly pricing
would be eliminated if patents were put in the public domain."); Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol at
645 (cited in note 8) ("[E]x post rewards increase the competition for the production and
distribution of a given innovation and they lead to price decrease as compared with the
patent system."); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 529, 535 (cited in note 10)
(assuming "no deadweight loss from monopoly pricing" in their model of the prize system);
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granted that the prize system is "superior to patent in that
deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing is avoided."29 Intellectual
property has a different virtue. It introduces artificial scarcity
into the market for inventions, forcing consumers to reveal their
willingness to pay for those products. As a result, it allows the
government to link the profits from innovation to consumer de-
mand-a market-based metric for social value.3o Many scholars
are skeptical that the government possesses enough information
about the social value of inventions to calculate prize payouts
adequate to replace these market-based incentives, 31 particularly
if there is no artificial scarcity in the market to reveal consumer
demand.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 BMJ 1279, 1279 (2006)
("The power of competitive markets would ensure a wide distribution [of drugs] at the
lowest possible price, unlike the current system, which uses monopoly power, with its
high prices and limited usage."); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1724 (cited in note 8).
29 Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 530 (cited in note 10). See also
Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, The Economics of Growth 438 (MIT 2009) (describing
how patent buyouts are appealing for "eliminating the (static) monopoly distortions gen-
erated by innovations in the absence of imitations"); Scotchmer, Innovation at 41 (cited
in note 15) ('The advantage of prizes over patents is that they can avoid the deadweight
loss of proprietary pricing."). A minority position in the literature holds that the distor-
tion caused by the higher taxes necessary to finance the prize system is worse than the
distortion from monopoly pricing. See notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
30 See John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Appli-
cations to Social Philosophy 933 (Longmans, Green 1926):
[A]n exclusive privilege, of temporary duration, is preferable [to a government-
determined prize] ... because the reward conferred by it depends upon the
invention's being found useful, and the greater the usefulness the greater the
reward; and because it is paid by the very persons to whom the service is ren-
dered, the consumers of the commodity.
But see Jean Tirole, Intellectual Property and Health in Developing Countries, in Abhijit
Vinayak Banerjee, Roland B~nabou, and Dilip Mookherjee, eds, Understanding Poverty
303, 313 (Oxford 2006) ("The patent system, for all its flaws, has the major benefit that
its market-based reward approach is not subject to the two rocks that bureaucratic pro-
cedures usually strike: capture and overpayment, and opportunistic expropriation and
underpayment.").
31 See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 398 (cited in note 3)
("[E]stimating the value of inventive contributions is a difficult task, and any bureaucratic
council entrusted with the job is bound to make mistakes and perpetrate inequities.
When inequity is inevitable, one might prefer that it be the result of an impersonal in-
come distribution mechanism."); George Stigler, The Organization of Industry 124 (Chi-
cago 1983) ('The difficulties of devising even remotely objective estimates of the social
value of pieces of knowledge are prodigious."). But see Arrow, Allocation of Resources for
Invention at 623 (cited in note 4) ('The difficulties of even ex post calculation of rates of
return [from inventions] are formidable though possibly not insuperable.").
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This framework for comparing intellectual property to prizes
has created a "unifying theme" in the literature.32 Most scholars
accept that if the government can use prize payouts to offer
equal or better incentives for innovation without using intellec-
tual property to gauge the social value of inventions, then the
government should replace intellectual property with prizes.3 In
this scenario, the prize system would rival or exceed the intellec-
tual property system's ability to promote innovation while avoiding
the deadweight loss caused by monopoly pricing from intellectual
property.
More recent literature adds a twist to the traditional
framework comparing intellectual property to prizes. The litera-
ture continues to assume that prizes allow for more efficient
consumer pricing than intellectual property and thus retains the
traditional unifying theme. 34 However, prize advocates now ar-
gue that prizes are superior to intellectual property not only be-
cause they reduce consumer deadweight loss, but also because
they offer better incentives for innovation. 35 The literature iden-
tifies a variety of reasons why the intellectual property system
offers suboptimal-usually inadequate-incentives for innova-
tion.36 By emphasizing the drawbacks of linking incentives to
monopoly profits, prize advocates have argued that if the gov-
ernment has even limited information about consumer demand
for inventions or access to some other signal of inventions' social
32 Peter S. Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1473, 1531 (Elsevier
2008) ("A unifying theme [of the prize literature] is that, if a prize giver can base the
prize on the value of the innovation, then he should do so, and prizes may dominate intellec-
tual property rights.").
33 See, for example, de Laat, 15 Intl J Indus Org at 370 (cited in note 15) ("[P]rizes
or contracts are always better than patents [when] the instruments can generate the
same reward structure, [since] the patent does so at a considerable welfare loss."); Gallini
and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 62 (cited in note 15) ("[When] value is observable
ex post[,] ... IP should not be used at all, since prizes ... can serve the same screening
function, and can motivate firms to the same levels of effort, but prizes avoid the
deadweight loss.").
34 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *2 (cited in note 16); Kapczynski and
Syed, 122 Yale L J at 1910 (cited in note 14); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1148 (cited in note
10); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1554 (cited in note 16); Shavell and van
Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 545 (cited in note 10) (arguing that prizes are superior to in-
tellectual property because of the efficiency of consumer pricing for inventions).
35 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *2 (cited in note 16); Kapczynski and
Syed, 122 Yale L J at 1941 (cited in note 14); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1148 (cited in note
10); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1553-54 (cited in note 16); Shavell and van
Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 545 (cited in note 10).
36 See notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
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value, it could offer prizes that would outperform the intellectual
property system. 37  Defenders of intellectual property
acknowledge that the incentives for innovation offered by tem-
porary monopoly rights are also suboptimal but argue that the
government lacks sufficient information about inventions' social
value and the institutional capacity to calculate prize payouts
that offer better incentives.38 Once again, the debate boils down to
whether the government can calculate prize payouts providing
equal or better incentives for innovation relative to monopoly
profits from intellectual property rights.39
This debate has been premised on a highly stylized compar-
ison of prizes and intellectual property that reflects mistaken
assumptions about the two systems. The literature generally
equates a prize system with perfectly efficient marginal cost
pricing and government control over the rewards for innovation.
And it depicts intellectual property as providing innovators with
monopoly profits while forcing consumers to bear the full brunt
of deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing. In reality,
patents and copyrights merely give innovators the right to ex-
clude others from the market.4° They do not give innovators a
37 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *2-3 (cited in note 16) ('CThe superiority
of the government's information concerning the social benefits of particular innovations
gives a prize system an equally clear advantage over a patent system, under which
research-and-development investments are directed toward lines of innovation that pri-
vate firms consider most potentially lucrative, not those that are most socially benefi-
cial."); Kapczynski and Syed, 122 Yale L J at 1907 (cited in note 14) (arguing that prizes
"can help promote important but highly nonexcludable innovations that would be ne-
glected by the patent system, and also help to counter the distortionary pressures that
may be generated by patents"); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1162 (cited in note 10) ("Patent
buyouts could potentially increase incentives for original invention closer to their social
value [and] reduce incentives for wasteful 'me too' research."); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi
Kent L Rev at 1553 (cited in note 16) ("By decoupling the rewards for successful R&D
investment from the sales of products, the new model will permit governments to create
more efficient and useful incentives for R&D that focus on inventions that improve
health outcomes."); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 545 (cited in note 10)
(noting that prize systems offer "potential gains from enhanced incentives to innovate, as
profits from patent and copyright may fall considerably short of consumer surplus");
Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1724 (cited in note 8) ("The innovation incentives are strong in
the patent system, but they are distorted, whereas the prize system can provide equiva-
lently strong incentives that are less distorted.").
38 See, for example, DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Thera-
putics at 489 (cited in note 15).
39 See Kapczynski and Syed, 122 Yale L J at 1954 (cited in note 14); Kremer, 113 Q
J Econ at 1138 (cited in note 10).
40 Patents give firms the exclusive right to make, use, and sell their inventions for
a limited period of time. See 35 USC § 271(a). Similarly, copyrights give the authors of
literary, musical, choreographic, dramatic, and artistic works the exclusive right to
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right to monopoly profits, nor do they prevent the government
from intervening in the market in other ways to improve incen-
tives for innovation or to prevent deadweight loss. The literature's
flawed comparison of the two systems leads scholars to frame
the debate in absolute terms, overlooking market forces and
other policy levers that may achieve the same basic objectives as
the prize system without eliminating intellectual property
rights. The true comparison between intellectual property and
prizes may be much less dramatic than scholars currently
imagine, and it often involves different considerations than
those addressed in the existing literature on prizes.41
The literature's flawed comparison between intellectual
property and prizes is most evident in the debate over replacing
drug patents with prizes-a field in which most developed
countries already accomplish (or could accomplish) the same
basic objectives of the prize system through their national
prescription-drug insurance programs without eliminating drug
patents. Ironically, prize advocates often claim that the poten-
tial gains from switching to a prize system would be greatest in
the pharmaceutical industry.42 They note that by replacing drug
reproduce, adapt, distribute, and publicly display those creations. See Robert A. Gorman
and Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright: Cases and Materials 38 (Foundation 6th ed 2002).
41 These observations explain why some of the early prize advocates who proposed
systems for replacing drug patents with prizes now advocate systems with government-
funded rewards for drugs in which innovators keep their drug patents and the govern-
ment imposes price controls along with its rewards. See, for example, Rachel Glennerster
and Michael Kremer, A Better Way to Spur Medical Research and Development, 23 Reg
34, 38 (Summer 2000) (advocating advanced purchase commitments instead of patent
buyouts-that is, prizes-to incentivize the development of vaccines for tropical diseases,
even though "[a] patent buyout would allow firms to compete freely to manufacture a
vaccine, [since] given the technical complexity of manufacturing vaccines and the ardu-
ous process of securing regulatory approval, competition might not be intense even if pa-
tents were put in the public domain"); Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 16
(cited in note 19) (concluding that, in their proposed system of reward payments for
drugs, the government would need to control consumer drug prices instead of relying on
competition to drive prices to marginal cost, and as a result, pharmaceutical companies
would not need to give up their patent rights in order to receive the reward payments).
42 See note 19. See also Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *2 (cited in note 16) (arguing
that there is a strong case for replacing drug patents with prizes because "governments
have (or can obtain) better information concerning the aggregate health benefits of drugs
than private parties"); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1163 (cited in note 10):
Pharmaceuticals are a natural area to try patent buyouts, since markets would
be relatively competitive in the absence of patents; patent protection is effec-
tive; monopoly markups are large; drugs are nondurable; "me too" inventions
are widespread; and considerable information is generated during FDA trials,
so potential bidders could make informed bids.
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patents with prizes, prescription drugs would quickly be forced to
compete with generics, and consumers would be able to purchase
them at prices far lower than the full monopoly price soon after
they reach the market. 43 The monetary prize for each new drug
would be determined and financed by the government, presum-
ably through higher taxes. Although consumers would bear the
burden of those higher taxes, they would be spared the deadweight
loss caused by monopoly pricing of new drugs. Assuming-as
many prize advocates claim-that the government has sufficient
information about drugs' social value to offer better incentives
for innovation through prize payouts, 44 the government could also
improve the pharmaceutical industry's innovative output. No
country (other than the Soviet Union45) has ever attempted to
implement such a system.46 Instead, in most developed coun-
tries, prescription drugs are purchased and distributed through
a national health insurance system. 47 Governments provide con-
sumers with prescription drug insurance, which allows them to
purchase drugs at the price of a typically modest co-payment
("co-pay") instead of the full monopoly price for drugs.48 These
co-pays are often similar to marginal cost pricing and therefore
avoid much of the deadweight loss associated with monopoly
pricing.49 The government pays pharmaceutical companies an
agreed-upon reimbursement rate for each prescription filled,
and citizens pay higher taxes to finance this system.50 The gov-
ernment still effectively determines the reward for new drugs
when it sets the reimbursement price, much the same as it
See also Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 544-45 (cited in note 10) (noting
that "the possible advantages of reward systems .... [are] exemplified by development
of pharmaceuticals, computer software, and recorded music and visual products," "where
the difference between price and production cost (after innovation) is large").
43 See, for example, Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 545 (cited in note 10).
44 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *2 (cited in note 16).
45 See note 96.
46 See Timothy J. Brennan, Molly K. Macauley, and Kate S. Whitefoot, Prizes or
Patents for Technology Procurement: An Analysis and Analytical Framework *7-10 (Dis-
cussion Paper, Resources for the Future, Dec 2012), online at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP- 11-21-REV.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
47 See US Department of Commerce, Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD
Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research and Development, and
Innovation *7-9 (Dec 2004), online at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicalsl
drugpricingstudy.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
48 See id at *7.
49 See DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics at 488
(cited in note 15).
50 See text accompanying notes 183-85.
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would in a prize system. The primary difference between a
national health insurance system and the proposed prize
schemes is that, with the former, drug companies keep their
patents.51
The close structural and functional similarities between
some proposed prize systems for drugs and national prescription-
drug insurance programs contrast sharply with the literature's
depiction of prize systems as a radical alternative to intellectual
property. Other scholars-including some prize advocates-have
noted that national prescription-drug insurance programs are
incredibly similar to a prize system.52 But this insight has not
softened the debate over replacing drug patents with prizes, nor
has it led scholars to revisit the existing theoretical framework
for comparing intellectual property to prizes.
Prize advocates mistakenly assume that promoting innovation
with prizes instead of intellectual property is the only effective
strategy for avoiding deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. 53
According to prize advocates, the chief structural advantage of
prizes over intellectual property rights is the capacity to "de-
link" the prices consumers pay for inventions from the profits
innovators earn, thereby facilitating access to the invention for
everyone who values it more than the marginal cost of produc-
tion.54 Prize advocates often depict the de-linking of rewards
from consumer prices as a fundamental advantage of prizes over
intellectual property, but this de-linking also occurs naturally in
the market through a form of price discrimination known as the
"two-part tariff."'5 Perhaps not coincidentally, the two-part tariff
is often found precisely where scholars have proposed switching
51 See Part II.
52 See, for example, Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation at *12 (cited at
note 16); Rai, 70 L & Contemp Probs at 128-30 (cited in note 16).
53 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *3-4 (cited in note 16) (noting that
deadweight loss under "a patent system can be mitigated in various ways," but "such de-
vices at best can reduce the problem, not solve it. A prize system, by contrast, is capable
of eliminating this problem altogether" because "competition among [drug] manufactur-
ers ... would keep prices low for everyone"); Joseph E. Stiglitz and Arjun Jayadev, Med-
icine for Tomorrow: Some Alternative Proposals to Promote Socially Beneficial Research
and Development in Pharmaceuticals, 7 J Generic Meds 217, 221 (2010) ("[Mjarket com-
petition provides the only effective mechanism to enforce market discipline and ensure
that drugs are provided as close to cost as possible, following the discovery of the new
chemical entity.").
54 James Love, De-linking R&D Costs from Product Prices *2-3 (Knowledge Ecolo-
gy International Apr 6, 2011), online at http://www.who.int/phi/news/phi-cewg
_lstmeet 10_KEI submission-en.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
55 See text accompanying notes 208-24.
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to prizes-prescription drugs and online digital media. The gov-
ernment also effectively de-links consumer prices within the pa-
tent system when it subsidizes consumers' purchasing power for
inventions. As noted above, this appears to be the strategy that
most developed countries are using to provide consumers with
access to prescription drugs. The United States uses a similar
strategy in subsidizing prescription drug insurance for certain
populations and offering tax credits for energy-efficient technology.
The resulting structures are remarkably similar to those in
many prize proposals.56
The literature's stylized depiction of prizes also leads scholars
to take for granted the prize system's superiority in reducing
deadweight loss. In many cases, a number of forces will persist
even after eliminating intellectual property that prevent a prize
system from moving consumer prices to marginal cost, including
innovators' trade secrets, other barriers to entry, and high fixed
production costs. At the same time, the government exercises
broad authority within an intellectual property system to inter-
vene and force prices closer to marginal cost. The combination of
these two factors means that, contrary to the oftentimes explicit
assumption in the prize literature, eliminating intellectual
property will not necessarily achieve more-efficient consumer
prices than is possible under an intellectual property system
and sometimes doing so may have the opposite effect. 57
Contrary to the stylized example, intellectual property is not
a legal right to monopoly profits. Intellectual property merely
provides the government an option to allow innovators to collect
monopoly profits. Governments can and frequently do intervene
in the market to adjust or void entirely the innovator's oppor-
tunity for monopoly profits. Replacing intellectual property with
prizes does not provide the government with any new infor-
mation or mechanism for setting superior incentives not already
available to the government in an intellectual property system
through existing tools such as subsidies, taxes, and government
purchases. To the extent that the government could improve the
incentives for innovation by adjusting rewards through a prize
system, it could just as easily improve those incentives with
payments to or taxes on innovators supplementing the intellectual
property system.58
56 See Part III.A.
57 See Part III.B.
58 See Part IV.B.
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Finally, the stylized example of prizes depicts the govern-
ment's control over payments to the innovator as absolute,
whereas prize proposals often contemplate negotiation of the
prize between the government and innovator. Indeed, many of
the most prominent prize proposals are "optional," meaning that
the innovator is given a choice between accepting payment in
the form of an intellectual property right or a prize. 59 The primary
justification for these optional-prize systems is to provide a
check against the government setting inadequate rewards for
innovation.60 However, intellectual property rights serve the
same function as an optional-prize system in countries where
the government is both setting the price and purchasing inven-
tions, as with drugs in most developed countries. Here, drug
patents provide firms with at least a modicum of leverage in
negotiations with the government. Since governments often re-
negotiate reimbursement rates (that is, reward payments) over
time as new information about their value becomes available,
eliminating this safeguard could be problematic.61 This previously
overlooked harm from switching to prizes may justify retaining
intellectual property even when the government can determine
the necessary reward to provide an equivalent incentive for in-
novation without intellectual property.62
Ultimately, the government's ability to implement a prize-
like system without eliminating intellectual property rights calls
into question the relevance and accuracy of the prize literature's
"unifying theme." The market forces and other government poli-
cies mentioned above can push consumer prices toward marginal
cost without eliminating intellectual property rights.63 In many
cases, these tools may result in more-efficient consumer pricing
(and, therefore, less deadweight loss) than would be achieved
59 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *33 (cited in note 16); Hollis and
Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 6-8 (cited in note 19); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1158-
59 (cited in note 10); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 541-45 (cited in note 10).
60 See, for example, Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 544 (cited in note
10). But see Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *34-36 (cited in note 16) (arguing that the gov-
ernment might be limited to instituting an optional-prize system because of the TRIPS
agreement).
61 See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 542 (cited in note 10) ("As events
unfold and information flows to the government, it could appropriately supplement
rewards, perhaps on an annual basis.... It would be a gross mistake to envision the re-
ward as having to be premised on the government's estimate of valuation at the time an
innovation is registered.").
62 See Part V.A.
63 See Part V.A.
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through a simple switch to prizes,64 since eliminating intellectual
property rights alone will often leave a significant gap between
the price of inventions and their marginal cost.6 5 The same gov-
ernment policies that help avoid deadweight loss also enable the
government to adjust the incentives for investing in research
and development ("R & D") without eliminating intellectual
property.6 6 Indeed, the desired superior incentives will often be
better achieved without moving to a prize system. Intellectual
property rights give innovators the option to reject the govern-
ment's offer for a reward, which provides a check against the
otherwise-significant risk of expropriation.67 The optional-prize
systems favored by many prize advocates have a similar property.68
However, by retaining intellectual property rights, innovators
and the government can renegotiate reward payments over time
as they acquire new information about the social value of inven-
tions.69 Consequently, even if the government has the ability to
calibrate prize payouts offering equal or better incentives for in-
novation, eliminating intellectual property rights might be a
mistake.
Part I of this Article reviews the ongoing debate over prizes
as an alternative to intellectual property to promote innovation.
This Part recounts the traditional and more recent comparisons
of the benefits and drawbacks of an intellectual property system
versus a prize system. It explains the basis in these comparisons
for the unifying theme of prize literature and the widely accepted
conclusion that a prize system is desirable if the resulting gains
from efficient access to innovation exceed the harm-if any-
from relying on the government to set the reward for innovation.
Part II identifies an apparent contradiction of the unifying
theme in the decision of a vast majority of developed countries to
continue to grant drug patents though not using them to deter-
mine the incentives for drug development. Part III reexamines
the presumed superiority of prizes at reducing deadweight loss.
It describes how the projected reductions in existing scholarship
are based on faulty comparisons of patents to prizes that typically
64 See Part V.A.
65 See Part III.B.
66 See Part IV.A.
67 See Part IV.B.
68 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *33-34 (cited in note 16); Kremer,
113 Q J Econ at 1137-38 (cited in note 10); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at
530-31 (cited in note 10).
69 See Part IV.B.
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ignore the substantial reductions in deadweight loss already
achieved within the patent system through price discrimination,
subsidies, taxes, and price controls. It also describes how the
comparisons overlook other forces that persist after eliminating
patents and prevent the introduction of price competition from
materially lowering consumer prices and reducing deadweight
loss. Part IV revisits the debate whether prizes might offer su-
perior incentives for innovation compared to intellectual property.
Contrary to the widely accepted position in the existing litera-
ture, the prize system does not offer any fundamental ad-
vantages over intellectual property in improving the incentives
for innovation, since any incentive achievable with prizes could
also be achieved through subsidies, taxes, or price controls with-
out eliminating intellectual property. This Part also explains
that when the government sets rewards for innovation, retain-
ing the intellectual property system operates in a manner simi-
lar to an optional-prize system. However, unlike an optional-
prize system, intellectual property rights provide an ongoing
check against suboptimal government rewards and provide flex-
ibility for innovators and the government to adjust reward pay-
ments over time. Part V builds on insights in Parts III and IV to
reframe the comparison between intellectual property and prizes.
I. BACKGROUND
Among scholars and policymakers, there is a broad consen-
sus that without government intervention, private industry
would significantly underinvest in the R & D of new ideas and
expressions.70 Historically, such intervention took the form of in-
tellectual property rights, but prizes have gained increasing
support. The primary benefit of the intellectual property system
has always been viewed as its ability to offer a market-based in-
centive for innovation tied to consumers' willingness to pay. Its
principal drawbacks have been considered to be the inevitable
creation of deadweight loss when generating that information
about consumer demand and the failure to motivate socially
valuable innovation when undervalued by the market. In con-
trast, the primary benefit of a prize system has typically been
70 See Adam B. Jaffe, Building Program Evaluation into the Design of Public Re-
search-Support Programs, 18 Oxford Rev Econ Pol 22, 22 (2002) ("It is widely accepted
that, in the absence of policy intervention, the social rate of return to R&D expenditure
exceeds the private rate, leading to a socially suboptimal rate of investment in R&D.").
2014] 1017
The University of Chicago Law Review
viewed as its ability to avoid the deadweight loss associated with
patents. The principal drawback of the prize system has recently
been challenged, but has generally been considered the difficulty of
setting incentives for innovation without knowledge of consumers'
willingness to pay and with greater political involvement (and the
attendant risks of corruption or incompetence). Based on these
comparisons of benefits and drawbacks, a relatively simple
framework has been developed. That is, a prize system is desir-
able if the resulting gains from efficient access to innovation ex-
ceed the harm-if any-from relying on the government to set
the reward for innovation.71
A. The Need for Government Intervention to Incentivize
Innovation
In a competitive market, the incentives for private actors to
invest in the R & D of new ideas and expressions tend to be in-
adequate.72 The problem stems from the intangibility of ideas
and expressions, which can make it hard to prevent others from
copying them. At the same time, the innovative process is often
expensive and risky.73 Writing a book or developing a drug usu-
ally requires a significant investment of time and resources, and
the innovator always faces the risk that the project will end as a
technological or commercial failure. If competitors can sell inex-
pensive duplicates of successful books or drugs without incur-
ring the same costs and risks, price competition may prevent
innovators from ever profiting on their R & D investment. The
innovator is also unrewarded for the substantial "knowledge
spillovers" generated by a successful invention, which advance
society's storehouse of knowledge and fuel subsequent innova-
tion.74 The empirical evidence suggests that spillover benefits
constitute a sizable portion of the total social returns from
71 See Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol at 645-46 (cited in note 8); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44
J L & Econ at 530 (cited in note 10).
72 See Arrow, Allocation of Resources for Invention at 617 (cited in note 4); Richard R.
Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J Polit Econ 297, 302 (1959).
73 See F.M. Scherer, New Perspectives on Economic Growth and Technological In-
novation 53-88 (Brookings 1999).
74 See Brett M. Frischmann and Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum L Rev 257,
268-69 (2007); John M. Golden, Innovation Dynamics, Patents, and Dynamic-Elasticity
Tests for the Promotion of Progress, 24 Harv J L & Tech 47, 61-63 (2010); Joel Mokyr,
The Contribution of Economic History to the Study of Innovation and Technical Change:
1750-1914, in Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, eds, 1 Handbook of the Economics
of Innovation 11, 14 (Elsevier 2010). See also William J. Baumol, The Free.Market Inno-
vation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism 11-12 (Princeton 2002).
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investments in R & D,75 so the inability of competitive markets
to adequately compensate and incentivize their creation is prob-
lematic. 76 In a perfectly competitive market, therefore, private
actors will be unwilling to invest as much as is socially desirable
in the production of new ideas and expressions that others can
freely copy. 77
Ironically, the very attribute that leads private actors to
underinvest in innovation-that is, the ease with which ideas
can be copied and built on-is the quality that has made innova-
tion so socially valuable. Ideas are public goods in the technical
sense of the term: their use by one person does not reduce their
availability to others.78 Since ideas can be used over and over
again without diminishment, they allow for increasing returns
to scale on the world's finite stock of human and capital re-
sources. 79 By extracting increasing value out of society's labor
and capital, innovation has generated much of the world's eco-
nomic growth since the Industrial Revolution.80 Innovation in
75 See Nicholas Bloom, Mark Schankerman, and John Van Reenen, Identifying
Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry, 81 Econometrica 1347, 1374-80
(2010) (estimating that knowledge spillovers cause the social returns from R & D to be
roughly double the private returns); Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev at 259-
61 & n 5 (cited in note 74) (reviewing a number of studies on the spillover benefits from
R & D); Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth 42-46 (Harvard 2004) (dis-
cussing the theoretical and empirical literature on R & D spillovers); Rebecca Henderson
and Iain Cockburn, Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research Produc.
tivity in Drug Discovery, 27 RAND J Econ 32, 45-55 (1996) (reporting large knowledge-
spillover benefits from private-sector R & D in the pharmaceutical industry); Kremer,
113 Q J Econ at 1141 (cited in note 10).
76 Of course, private actors can be incentivized by forces other than monetary com-
pensation, but monetary incentives are the predominant currency in private industry.
77 See Shavell, Foundations at 138-40 (cited in note 3). This does not imply that
markets free from government intervention cannot support investments in the produc-
tion of knowledge or information-only that those investments will tend to be inade-
quate. See Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 384 (cited in note 3).
78 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev Econ &
Stat 387, 387 (1954) (defining a public good as one for which "each individual's consump-
tion of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of
that good"). More than a century earlier, Thomas Jefferson offered a more elegant formu-
lation of why information and knowledge are different from tangible goods: "He who re-
ceives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me." Thomas Jefferson, Letter
to Isaac McPherson (Aug 13, 1813), online at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/al_8_8sl2.html (visited Aug 12, 2014).
79 See Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas, in Philippe Aghion and Steven N.
Durlauf, eds, 1B Handbook of Economic Growth 1063, 1065-66 (Elsevier 2005); Paul M.
Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J Polit Econ S71, 873-878 (1990).
80 See Menell and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law at 1476 (cited in note 32)
("It is now widely recognized that technological advancement and enhanced human capital
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the form of new ideas, and particularly new technologies, is
believed to be responsible for much of the wealth of modern in-
dustrialized societies.81
This dual nature of innovation-simultaneously prone to
underinvestment and essential to social welfare-makes govern-
ment intervention to promote innovation crucial to society's well-
being in some circumstances. Without government intervention,
private investments in R & D would tend to be inadequate-and
perhaps significantly so.82 Economists often disagree about the
best policies for encouraging socially valuable innovation,S3 but
they all seem to accept the need for some form of government
intervention.84
B. A Brief History of the Choice between Patents and Prizes
Most developed nations rely on intellectual property as their
primary tool for promoting private investment in innovation. An
alternative approach is for the government to reward innovators
with a prize instead of an intellectual property right, thereby
allowing the innovation to enter "immediately into the public
domain" for all to use.85
The idea of replacing intellectual property rights with prizes
is said to be nearly as old as the intellectual property system
are the principal engines of economic growth in the United States and other industrial-
ized countries."); Joel Mokyr, Long-Term Economic Growth and the History of Technology, in
Aghion and Durlauf, eds, 1B Handbook of Economic Growth 1114, 1116-19 (cited in note
79) (linking the Industrial Revolution and subsequent technological innovation with the
unprecedented economic growth of modern industrialized societies); Paul M. Romer, Two
Strategies for Economic Development: Using Ideas and Producing Ideas, Proceedings of
the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 63, 64 (1992) (arguing for
the importance of innovation and dissemination of "ideas" rather than just technology-
for economic growth).
81 See Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, Growth with Quality-Improving Innova-
tions: An Integrated Framework, in Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds, 1A
Handbook of Economic Growth 67, 69 (Elsevier 2005) (noting that "[tiechnological pro-
gress" is "the mainspring of long-run economic growth"); Richard R. Nelson, The Sources
of Economic Growth 31 (Harvard 1996) ("Virtually all scholars of productivity growth
now agree on the central role of technological advance.").
82 See Jones, Growth and Ideas at 1087 (cited in note 79).
83 See, for example, Menell and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law at 1477-78
(cited in note 32).
84 See, for example, Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Mo-
nopoly 237, 257-59 (Cambridge 2008) (advocating the abolition of intellectual property
but acknowledging that, at least in the pharmaceutical industry, the government would
need to increase public financing of clinical drug development).
85 Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol at 642 (cited in note 8).
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itself.86 James Madison actually proposed a prize system during
the Constitutional Convention,87 although it appears that it was
never discussed,8s and the delegates clearly opted for the Intellec-
tual Property Clause now found in the Constitution.9 In Europe
in the mid-eighteenth century, at a time when many govern-
ments were considering abolishing the patent system altogether,
prizes were a frequently discussed alternative. 90 The antipatent
movement attracted less attention in the United States at that
time, although in 1886 a congressman actually introduced a bill
in the US House of Representatives to repeal the patent laws
and establish a system of rewards for inventors. 91
Defenders of intellectual property ultimately won out over
the system's critics. 92 Enthusiasm for the prize system dwindled
86 See note 13.
87 See Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 325 (Yale
1911) (quoting Madison's proposal to grant Congress the power "[t]o encourage by pre-
miums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries."). See also
James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Oct 17, 1788), online at
http://www.constitution.org/jm/17881017-tj.htm (visited Aug 12, 2014):
With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest nusances
in Government. But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and
ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced? Would
it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the Public to abolish the privilege
at a price to be specified in the grant of it?
88 See Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 325 (cited in
note 87).
89 US Const Art I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
90 See Janis, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 939-41 (cited in note 1) (comparing modern
proposals for a prize system with a proposal by Robert Andrew Macfie in 1864); Machlup
and Penrose, 10 J Econ Hist at 19 (cited in note 1):
The alternatives most frequently recommended in lieu of patents were bonuses
granted to inventors (a) by the government, (b) by professional associations fi-
nanced through voluntary contributions by private industries, (c) by an inter-
governmental agency, or (d) by an international association maintained
through contributions from industries of all countries. Proposals along these
lines were discussed in the professional journals and conferences almost every-
where.
See also Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 526 (cited in note 10), citing MacLeod,
Inventing the Industrial Revolution at 191-96 (cited in note 13).
91 See Knowledge Ecology International, Selected Innovation Prizes at *46 (cited in
note 7).
92 See Machlup and Penrose, 10 J Econ Hist at 19-20 (cited in note 1) (noting that
although proposals to give inventors prizes instead of patents "were discussed in the pro-
fessional journals and conferences almost everywhere" in the mid- and late 1800s, they
"did not receive great support"); Janis, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 939-41 (cited in note 1).
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in the late 1800s.93 By the turn of the century, economists
showed little interest in the idea of replacing intellectual property
with a prize system.94 With a few notable exceptions, the economic
literature was devoid of any serious analysis of the prize system
for most of the twentieth century.95
In practice, governments now rarely use prizes as an alter-
native to intellectual property,96 leading some scholars to label
prizes the "neglected innovation incentive. 97 Although govern-
ments and private organizations frequently offer prizes to pro-
mote certain types of innovation, the vast majority of these prizes
are not conditioned on innovators giving up their intellectual
property rights.98 These prizes simply supplement the existing
intellectual property system.
93 See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 527 (cited in note 10).
94 See id.
95 See Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1144-46 (cited in note 10) (discussing two examples
of patent buyouts in the early nineteenth century).
96 There are a few examples of prize offerings that required the invention be placed
in the public domain. In 1802, South Carolina purchased Eli Whitney's patent rights on
the cotton gin within the state for $50,000, although Whitney experienced some trouble
collecting the prize. See id at 1145. In 1839, France awarded the inventor of photography
an annual pension of 10,000 francs in exchange for his patent rights, which the govern-
ment then devoted to the public domain (except in England). See id at 1144. In 1855, the
Steam-Coal Collieries' Association at Newcastle offered a £500 reward for a "method for
preventing the emission of smoke from the chimneys of multitubular boilers," with pay-
ment conditional on the absence of patent rights or certain restrictions on those rights.
Knowledge Ecology International, Selected Innovation Prizes at *18 (cited in note 7). In
1859, the British Horological Institute offered a reward for the invention of a watch that
was "the best English-made going-barrel movement that can be made in fair trade at a
moderate price" without a "patent [or] exclusive right." Id at *45. In 1931, the Soviet Union
created an authorship-certificate program wherein inventors could receive prizes in lieu
of a patent, which was maintained until 2001. See id at *47-48. In 1946, the United
States abolished patents on inventions related to the use of atomic energy for military
purposes and established the US Patent Compensation Board, which had authority to
offer rewards for those inventions. See id at *19. In 2007, an unnamed entity posted a
$20,000 prize on InnoCentive.com, a registry for scientific-innovation prizes, for the in-
vention of a dry-based biolatrine along with "no patents or patent applications preventing
the use of the solution." Id at *27-28.
97 Jiri Saar, Prizes: The Neglected Innovation Incentive *1 (unpublished paper,
Lund University Masters Programme, 2006), online at http://www.taaler.ee/vabalog/Saar
,2006-Prizes.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014). See also Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L &
Econ at 527 (cited in note 10).
98 See generally Knowledge Ecology International, Selected Innovation Prizes (cited
in note 7).
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C. The Traditional Critique of Intellectual Property:
Deadweight Loss
1. The inevitability of deadweight loss in an intellectual
property system.
The fundamental critique of using intellectual property to
promote innovation has always been that it reduces the public's
access to new innovations. Intellectual property creates
deadweight loss by allowing an innovator to prevent competitors
from entering the market and driving down the price of the in-
vention.99 The higher prices resulting from these monopoly
rights cause some consumers to exit the market even though
they value the innovation above its marginal cost of produc-
tion. 100 In an efficient market, consumers have access to goods
whenever they value them more than their marginal cost. Since
the higher prices caused by intellectual property are the mecha-
nism through which the system promotes innovation,
deadweight loss is often said to be an inevitable consequence of
the system. 101
The classic depiction (and defense) of intellectual property is
that it reveals consumers' willingness to pay by allowing the
innovator to introduce artificial scarcity into the market for its
invention.102 Without intellectual property, the innovator cannot
make consumers reveal how much they value and are willing to
pay for the innovation, because the innovator will be undersold
by other firms offering the innovation at a lower price. With in-
tellectual property, the innovator can test the market's willing-
ness to pay for the innovation. However, the higher monopoly
price charged by the innovator pushes at least some consumers
out of the market even though they value the innovation at
more than its marginal cost to produce. In short, by using arti-
ficial scarcity to base the reward for inventions on consumers'
99 See note 247.
100 See Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach 445-49
(Norton 8th ed 2009).
101 See, for example, Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1700 (cited in note 8); William D.
Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological
Change 82, 86 (MIT 1969) ("The optimal system of production of knowledge has a price
for information of zero, whereas the patent system ensures a nonzero price for the life of
the patent.").
102 Scarcity does not naturally occur in the market for innovation because, unlike
most goods, ideas can be used and reused endlessly without depletion or scarcity. See
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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willingness to pay, intellectual property rights can result in an
inefficient allocation of those goods and the associated
deadweight loss.103
Defenders of the intellectual property system are quick to
note that because innovators can engage in price discrimination,
their monopoly rights do not necessarily create deadweight
loss.o4 Firms have an incentive to offer discounts to consumers
who are unwilling to pay the full monopoly price.105 Every con-
sumer who values a good above its marginal cost but below the
monopoly price represents a potentially profitable transaction
for the patent holder. If the firm can continue to charge an ele-
vated price to most consumers while offering discounts to those
who are unwilling to pay the full monopoly price, the firm can
avoid the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. 106
Although perfect price discrimination could eliminate the
deadweight loss caused by intellectual property, that type of
pricing is usually impossible.107 Two primary hurdles stand in
the way of discriminatory pricing. First, firms need a way to
identify consumers who are unwilling to pay the monopoly price
so that they can offer those consumers a discount. Since all con-
sumers prefer a lower price, firms cannot easily identify the ones
who need a lower price merely by asking.1OS They can charge dif-
ferent prices based on the quantity or quality of goods pur-
chased, which may help sort consumers according to their will-
ingness to pay, or they can offer discounts to consumers based
on observable characteristics that are associated with a weaker
103 See notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
104 See, for example, Kieff, 85 Minn L Rev at 727-32 (cited in note 11) (arguing that
"[c]oncerns about dead-weight loss also do not provide a proper motivation for seeking
alternatives to the system" because "[tihe ability to price discriminate actually gives the
patentee strong financial incentive to elect not to restrict output").
105 See William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Infor-
mation?, 55 UCLA L Rev 1, 14-16 (2007); Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives at 37
(cited in note 15).
106 See Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in Mark Armstrong and
Rob Porter, eds, 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization 2221, 2226 (Elsevier 2007).
107 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intel-
lectual Property Law 375-77 (Harvard 2003); Lichtman, 11 Harv J L & Tech at 133 n 25
(cited in note 16); Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals:
Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U Ill L
Rev 173, 188; Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives at 37 (cited in note 15) ("Price dis-
crimination can go a long distance toward redressing the inefficiency of deadweight loss,
but it is hard to implement.").
108 See Fisher, 55 UCLA L Rev at 3-4 (cited in note 105); Scotchmer, Innovation and
Incentives at 37-38 (cited in note 15); Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization at
137 (cited in note 5).
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demand for the product.1°9 Both strategies can be costly and are
almost always imperfect sorting devices. 11o Second, firms must
be able to stop the consumers who receive discounts from resell-
ing the good to the consumers who are willing to pay the full
price."' There are often practical and legal difficulties with bar-
ring consumers from reselling intellectual property goods, which
can reduce firms' ability to price discriminate.112
Given the limited capacity of monopolists to achieve perfect
price discrimination, deadweight loss is widely viewed as a fun-
damental and inevitable drawback of the intellectual property
system.,,, As discussed later in this Article, the existing litera-
ture often overlooks certain critical forms of price discrimination
that alleviate the deadweight loss attributable to intellectual
property in these markets. 114 Nevertheless, it is clear that when
the government awards monopoly rights to promote innovation
and does not otherwise intervene in the market for those goods,
firms will rarely be able to eliminate deadweight loss through
perfect price discrimination.115
2. Avoiding deadweight loss with a prize system.
Based on this description of how intellectual property rights
distort consumer prices and cause deadweight loss, the chief
advantage of prizes over intellectual property seems almost self-
explanatory. By eliminating intellectual property rights, the
prize system would remove an impediment to efficient consumer
pricing, thereby alleviating deadweight loss. As a result, the
avoidance of deadweight loss associated with intellectual prop-
erty has historically been the most appealing aspect of using
prizes to set incentives for innovation.116
109 See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 Cardozo L
Rev 55, 69-75 (2001).
110 See generally Peter T. Leeson and Russell S. Sobel, Costly Price Discrimination,
99 Econ Letters 206 (2008). Certain pricing schemes, such as second-degree price dis-
crimination involving quality differentiation, can sometimes reduce total social surplus.
See Meurer, 23 Cardozo L Rev at 71-80 (cited in note 109).
111 See Meurer, 23 Cardozo L Rev at 69-75 (cited in note 109).
112 See Fisher, 55 UCLA L Rev at 13-20 (cited in note 105); Meurer, 23 Cardozo L
Rev at 83-85 (cited in note 109).
113 See notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
114 See Part III.A.
115 See text accompanying notes 107-12.
116 See, for example, Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 62 (cited in note
15) ("IP and prizes can serve the same screening function, and can motivate firms to the
same levels of effort, but prizes avoid the deadweight loss."); Shavell, Foundations at 162
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Of course, the literature on prizes recognizes that a prize
system would create its own deadweight loss because the gov-
ernment must raise revenue to pay for those awards. 117 Revenue
raised with sales or service taxes increases the price of access to
the innovation and causes some portion of consumers that would
otherwise enjoy the invention to exit the market. Similarly, rev-
enue raised with income taxes will cause labor distortion, as
consumers' incentive to work beyond a certain point is reduced
in favor of leisure time.118 Although these and related costs can
be significant,119 the conventional wisdom is that the deadweight
loss from monopoly pricing on particular goods and services is
usually worse. 120 Some economists even argue that, because of
redistributive effects and the potential for an offsetting tax ad-
justment, any labor-distortion costs from financing public goods
through an income tax should be ignored.121 Although the
amount of deadweight loss attributable to taxation remains con-
troversial, the literature on prizes widely assumes that
deadweight loss is generally a greater concern with intellectual
property than with prizes122-at least in most instances.123
(cited in note 3) (describing the prize system as one in which, "[i]n general, due to compe-
tition, goods embodying new information would tend to sell at prices resembling produc-
tion cost, meaning that the quantity sold would tend toward the optimal").
117 See, for example, Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 54 (cited in note 15).
118 See Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in
Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds, 1 Handbook of Public Economics 61, 110-12
(Elsevier 1985).
119 See Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax,
81 Rev Econ & Stat 674, 677-79 (1999).
120 See, for example, Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 54-55 (cited in
note 15); Guell and Fischbaum, 73 Milbank Q at 214 (cited in note 15); Romer, 92 Am
Econ Rev at 215 (cited in note 15); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1713-14 (cited in note 8);
Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 691 (cited in note 15). But see Duffy, 71 U Chi L Rev at 46
(cited in note 16):
A reward system cannot be compared to IP rights without comparing the dis-
tortionary effects of patents and taxes. .. . Given that the IP right holder also
has the potential constraint of competition from other technology, it is by no
means clear that the IP right holder will cause greater distortions than the
government's revenue agents.
121 See, for example, Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
222-25 (Princeton 2010) (arguing that labor distortion incidental to the financing and
provision of public goods normally should not weigh against the efficiency gains from
such a program because that distortion could be avoided with an offsetting adjustment to
the income tax, and because the costs of the distortion need to be measured against the
corresponding redistributive benefits).
122 See note 120 and accompanying text.
123 The opposite may be true for some innovations. Monopoly pricing is probably
preferable for any innovation that increases the value of leisure in relation to labor (for
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In short, deadweight loss occurs in an intellectual property
system due to monopoly pricing and in a prize system due to
taxation for financing the system. Following the economic and
legal literature on prizes, this Article assumes that the
deadweight loss caused by monopoly pricing is greater than the
deadweight loss caused by taxation.124 However, as discussed
later in this Article, this literature has taken for granted-often
through explicit assumption-that eliminating intellectual
property will reduce deadweight loss by moving consumer prices
closer to marginal cost. 125
D. The Traditional Justification for Intellectual Property and
Its Shortcomings: Incentives
Traditionally, the market-based reward for innovation has
been considered the primary benefit of using intellectual property
to set incentives for innovation. There have always been flaws in
the incentives that result from linking the reward for innovation
to consumers' willingness to pay. Many prize advocates have
begun to argue that these flaws run so deep that a prize system
would offer superior incentives for innovation. However, other
scholars remain concerned about the government's ability to set
rewards correctly, given its limited information about the social
value of inventions and the risks associated with greater politi-
cal involvement (and the associated risks of corruption and
incompetence).
1. A market-based incentive for innovation.
The intellectual property system uses consumers' willing-
ness to pay as the measure of social value on which to base incen-
tives. When consumers decide whether to buy a particular good
and how much they are willing to pay for it, they reveal some-
thing about its value to them. In the aggregate, these decisions
example, many video games). See Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
at 226 (cited in note 121). Arguably, monopoly pricing is also preferable for innovations
that benefit only a narrow group of people. See Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives at
38 (cited in note 15).
124 See Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 54 (cited in note 15); Guell
and Fischbaum, 73 Milbank Q at 214 (cited in note 15); Romer, 92 Am Econ Rev at 215
(cited in note 15); Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 691 (cited in note 15).
125 See note 28 and accompanying text.
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constitute the consumer demand for that good.126 To the extent
that the social value of a good is simply the sum of all the benefits
(and costs) that different consumers derive from it, the market
provides a way of measuring the social worth of new products.
Assuming that consumers do not pay more for innovations than
their value to them, intellectual property connects the rewards
for innovation to the value they create by allowing firms to keep
a portion of that value.
For economists, the principal justification for the patent sys-
tem has always been this potential to link the reward for inven-
tions to their social value. Despite his fierce opposition to most
government-granted monopolies, Adam Smith decided that pa-
tents can "be vindicated" as "the easiest and most natural way
in which the state can recompense [inventors] for hazarding a
dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is after-
ward to reap the benefit."'127 John Stuart Mill defended the pa-
tent system on the same ground, pointing out that "the reward
conferred by [a patent] depends upon the invention's being found
useful, and the greater the usefulness the greater the reward."'12
Modern economists still offer this same justification for the patent
system.129 While legal scholars occasionally emphasize other po-
tential benefits from patents, 130 the primary justification for the
126 See Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic
Theory 105-23 (Oxford 1995) (noting the complicated relationship between aggregate
consumer demand for a good-that is, the consumer-demand curve-and measures of
social value).
127 Adam Smith, 2 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
339, 712 (Oxford 2d ed 1869) (James E. Thorold Rogers, ed).
128 Mill, Principles of Political Economy at 933 (cited in note 30).
129 See, for example, Menell and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law at 1477 (cited
in note 32); Shavell, Foundations at 138 (cited in note 3).
130 There is a group of legal scholars that defends the patent system on the same
grounds as other property rights-that patents encourage the efficient management and
use of the property. See, for example, John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Iso-
lationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 Tex L Rev 1077, 1094-95 (2005); Kieff, 85
Minn L Rev at 747 (cited in note 11); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Er-
rors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 Vand L Rev 1727, 1729-38
(2000); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 Yale L J 1742, 1795-97 (2007). A number of scholars have challenged
this argument, leading to a lively debate. See generally, for example, James Bessen and
Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innova-
tors at Risk (Princeton 2008); Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev 257 (cited in
note 74); Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can' Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci 698 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U Chi L Rev 129 (2004); Peter
S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J Legal
Analysis 1 (2013); Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
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system continues to be that it provides a market-based incentive
for the development of socially valuable inventions.131
2. Flaws in the incentives offered by intellectual property.
In a recent twist of the debate, some prize advocates now
argue that the potential for prizes to provide better incentives
than patents for innovation is an independent reason to replace
intellectual property with prizes-separate and aside from the
classical justification of reducing deadweight loss. 132 Prize advo-
cates identify a number of problems with an intellectual property
system in which the incentives for innovation are based on con-
sumers' willingness to pay-some more controversial than others.
a) Failure to motivate socially valuable innovation. One
problem identified by prize advocates with using intellectual
property to determine the incentives for innovation is that con-
sumers' willingness to pay may not accurately measure an inno-
vation's social value. Although a full treatment of the issue is
outside the scope of this Article, the connection between con-
sumer demand for an invention and its social value is subject to
debate. For example, some scholars argue that the social worth of
a good depends (at least in part) on values that are distinct from
its utility to consumers.13 A few even go so far as to argue that the
of Patent Scope, 90 Colum L Rev 839 (1990). In addition to the property rights debate,
there is a small literature about whether patents reduce transaction costs in the licens-
ing of technology. See, for example, Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information with-
out Intellectual Property, 91 Tex L Rev 227, 276-79 (2012). Scholars have also discussed
whether the patent system facilitates innovation by disclosing technical information
about inventions in patent applications that other researchers can then use in their own
work. See, for example, Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L Rev 539, 547-56
(2009); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 Harv J L
& Tech 545, 561-65 (2012); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 Harv L Rev 2007, 2013-26 (2005). There is even a discussion about whether
patents are an important signaling device for the value of inventions. See, for example,
Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U Chi L Rev 625, 647-49 (2002); Gideon Parchomovsky
and R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U Pa L Rev 1, 20-22 (2005).
131 See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va L Rev
1575, 1580 (2003).
132 Professor Joseph Stiglitz, for example, writes that "[t]he innovation incentives
are strong in the patent system, but they are distorted, whereas the prize system can
provide equivalently strong incentives that are less distorted." Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at
1724 (cited in note 8). See also Love and Hubbard, 18 Annals Health L at 160 (cited in
note 19) ("The use of cash prizes to eliminate legal monopolies for products provides a
powerful opportunity to address several flaws that plague the current system. In par-
ticular, policy makers would have far more freedom to design incentives efficiently.").
133 See, for example, Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? 41-43
(Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2009).
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social value of a good is entirely a function of its intrinsic qualities,
such as the value of the labor that went into creating it.134
Most scholars seem to accept that an invention's social value
is related to its value to the people who use it, but many remain
uncomfortable with the use of willingness to pay as a measure of
that utility because people with higher incomes are usually will-
ing to pay higher prices, implying that the use of an invention by
a wealthy person is more valuable than a seemingly equivalent
use by a poor person.135 As a result, intellectual property can offer
an inadequate reward for innovations that primarily benefit the
poor. 3 6 This issue is thought to be particularly important in the
pharmaceutical industry, in which firms devote very little of
their R & D investments to diseases like malaria and tuberculosis
that primarily affect people who cannot afford to pay high drug
prices.137
Putting aside this objection, consumers' willingness to pay
still does not reflect the positive or negative externalities associ-
ated with the creation or use of inventions, which are often sig-
nificant. Examples of such externalities include knowledge spill-
overs that spur additional R & D and innovation,138 or an
anticommons effect that deters them.139 Moreover, the true value
of an invention to consumers may be different from their will-
ingness to pay for it if there are informational problems in the
market, or if consumers have behavioral biases that distort their
purchasing decisions.140 Innovators also do not appropriate the
consumer surplus from their inventions.'4' The available empirical
evidence suggests that innovators typically capture only a small
134 See, for example, Karl Marx, Value, Price and Profit 14 (International Publishers
1974) (Eleanor Marx Aveling, ed) ("A commodity has a value, because it is a crystalliza-
tion of social labour. The greatness of its value.., depends upon.., the relative mass of
labour necessary for its production.") (emphasis omitted).
135 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 Harv L &
Pol Rev 303, 308-16 (2007).
136 See Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 3-6 (cited in note 19); Stiglitz,
57 Duke L J at 1720-21 (cited in note 8); Fisher, Promises to Keep at 234 (cited in note 16).
137 See, for example, Ernst R. Berndt, et al, Advance Market Commitments for Vac-
cines against Neglected Diseases: Estimating Costs and Effectiveness, 16 Health Econ
491, 491-92 (2007); DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics at
489-90 (cited in note 15).
138 See Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1141 (cited in note 10).
139 See Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol at 652-53 (cited in note 8); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1711
(cited in note 8).
140 See Sunstein, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev at 323-28 (cited in note 135).
141 See Arrow, Allocation of Resources for Invention at 622 (cited in note 4).
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portion of the social value generated by their inventions,142
which suggests that the incentives for innovation through intel-
lectual property are systematically inadequate. 143
For all these reasons, prize advocates argue that a funda-
mental drawback of using intellectual property to set the incen-
tives for innovation is the inability to motivate socially valuable
innovation whose value is not reflected in consumers' willing-
ness to pay.144 This move deemphasizes the prize system's supe-
riority in reducing deadweight loss from monopoly pricing,
focusing instead on its capacity to promote socially valuable
innovations with inadequate market demand145 and to promote
innovation while also offering significant redistributive benefits.146
b) Socially wasteful R & D and duplicative innovation.
Prize advocates cite another problem with using intellectual
property to determine the incentives for innovation: the poten-
tial for socially wasteful R & D and duplicative innovation. One
social cost of offering greater incentives than are necessary to mo-
tivate development is a phenomenon known as "patent racing."
Notwithstanding the name, the phenomenon exists in a prize
system as well as a patent system.147 It occurs when an excessive
incentive leads firms to engage in socially wasteful behavior to
capture those excess profits. Prizes and patents are both a re-
ward for successful innovation. When a larger incentive is given
than is necessary to motivate an invention, the excess reward
142 See Congressional Budget Office, R&D and Productivity Growth *23-28 (Discus-
sion Paper, June 2005), online at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
64xx/doc6482/06-17-r-d.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014); Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D
Spillovers, 94 Scand J Econ S29, S43 (1992); Bronwyn H. Hall, Jacques Mairesse, and
Pierre Mohnen, Measuring the Returns to R&D, in Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg,
eds, 2 Handbook of the Economics of Innovation 1034, 1073 (Elsevier 2010); Charles I.
Jones and John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q J Econ 1119,
1134 (1998).
143 See Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1140-42 (cited in note 10); Shavell and van Ypersele,
44 J L & Econ at 529 (cited in note 10).
144 See, for example, Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1706-09 (cited in note 8).
145 See Love and Hubbard, 18 Annals Health L at 160 (cited in note 19).
146 One scholar has observed that "one of the great advantages of an alternative
compensation system [of prizes] as compared to a market system" is that:
In the former, unlike the latter, the menu of entertainment products made
available to the public would reflect fairly the preferences of all consumers of
digital entertainment and would not be tilted toward the tastes of the rich, who
are able and willing to pay more for their songs and films.
Fisher, Promises to Keep at 234 (cited in note 16).
147 See Shavell, Foundations at 163 (cited in note 3); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1722-
23 (cited in note 8); Stine, Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes at 20 (cited in
note 7); Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 699-700 (cited in note 15).
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creates unnecessary competition between firms to expend re-
sources in ways that, although justifiable for the winning firm,
reduce the benefit of the innovation to society as a whole.
This harm can take the form of socially wasteful R & D spend-
ing to expedite an invention. When multiple firms compete with
one another to produce a new type of innovation, they all may
have an incentive to accelerate their R & D to be first to the mar-
ket and enjoy a lead time advantage over their competitors. 148 The
result can be excessive-and therefore socially inefficient-
spending on R & D. Although the winner may profit from such
expenditures, it does not internalize the R & D costs of the losers. 149
The net loss may also take the form of duplicative innova-
tion or excessive marketing, in which firms develop and promote
new innovations that are very similar to ones developed by their
competitors, expecting that at least some of their profits will
come from capturing market share. 150 An invention that provides
little or no benefit compared to an existing technology may have
little social value but garner significant profits in a patent system
(or a prize system if prize payments are tied to sales volume) if
enough consumers decide to buy the new invention.151 To the ex-
tent that consumers could have enjoyed the same benefits by
purchasing the original invention, the incentive provided for the
new invention is excessive, and the competition among firms to
capture it leads to socially wasteful R & D and marketing.152
Although patent racing exists in both intellectual property
and prize systems, some prize advocates argue that the prize
system would better avoid the associated harms. 153 They propose
148 See William L. Baldwin and Gerald L. Childs, The Fast Second and Rivalry in
Research and Development, 36 S Econ J 18, 18-19 (1969); Morton I. Kamien and Nancy
L. Schwartz, Timing of Innovations under Rivalry, 40 Econometrica 43, 58-59 (1972);
Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q J Econ 395, 408-09 (1979); F.M.
Scherer, Research and Development Resource Allocation under Rivalry, 81 Q J Econ 359,
392-94 (1967); Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 691 (cited in note 15).
149 See Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization at 399 (cited in note 5).
150 See id at 397-98.
151 See Baldwin and Childs, 36 S Econ J at 18-20 (cited in note 148).
152 See Menell and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law at 1488-90 (cited in note
32); Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization at 399-400 (cited in note 5). Firms can
avoid such waste by licensing their technologies to competitors or by forming joint R & D
ventures, but this sort of cooperation is not always possible. See Nancy T. Gallini, Deter-
rence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing, 74 Am Econ Rev 931, 937-
40 (1984).
153 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *3 (cited in note 16):
[A] government, relying on its superior knowledge [of the social value of drugs],
can construct and administer a prize system in ways that correct ... the bias
1032 [81:999
Intellectual Property versus Prizes
that, because the prize system would give the government direct
control over incentives, the government could more easily penalize
socially wasteful R & D and duplicative innovation.154
c) Stifling future innovation. A third problem cited by prize
advocates with the incentives for innovation set by intellectual
property is the potential for monopoly rights on earlier innova-
tions to stifle later ones. Innovation is a cumulative phenome-
non: one advance leads to the next, and researchers are always
building on some previous innovations in their own work. Regard-
less of whether the government is using intellectual property or
prizes to encourage innovation, it needs to consider the relation-
ship between past and present innovations when setting re-
wards.155 Allocating more than the minimum incentive necessary
to earlier innovators can stifle subsequent innovators in either
system.
In an intellectual property system, an excessive incentive
(for example, a broader, longer, or stronger intellectual property
right than necessary) stifles future innovation by making it
harder for other researchers to use innovations protected by the
intellectual property in their own work.156 Using the protected
innovation typically requires procuring a license from prior inno-
vators, which results in licensing costs (and transaction costs
associated with negotiating licenses) for the subsequent innova-
tors. Put differently, intellectual property can raise the price of
innovations as research inputs and therefore reduce their use in
the production of subsequent innovations.157
toward "me-too drugs" (the term conventionally used to describe drugs that,
when introduced into the market, offer little or no health benefits over extant
drugs).
See also Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1720 (cited in note 8) ("[T]he prize system has the ad-
vantage that there is less incentive to waste money on advertising and to engage in other
anticompetitive behaviors designed to enhance monopoly profits.").
154 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *4-5 (cited in note 16).
155 See Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives at 131 (cited in note 15). For example,
when subsequent innovations are made possible by earlier ones, the government may
want some of the reward for the new innovations to go to the original innovator. Similarly,
innovations that are only minor improvements on older technologies warrant smaller
rewards, and to the extent that prior innovations facilitate the R & D of newer ones, the
government can offer smaller rewards to motivate the development of the newer ones.
156 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 Tex L Rev 989, 996-97 (1997); Merges and Nelson, 90 Colum L Rev at 880-84
(cited in note 130); Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives at 127-57 (cited in note 15)
(reviewing the economics literature on cumulative innovation).
157 Debate exists on this point, with many scholars arguing that intellectual property
rights can sometimes facilitate the commercialization of inventions and make it easier to
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In a prize system, an excessive incentive can stifle future
innovation because subsequent innovators will likely be seeking
compensation from the same system. It is true that the stifling
effects of licensing are avoided in a prize system by placing the
innovation immediately into the public domain.158 However,
since government resources are finite, and the government must
divide profits among sequential innovators, an excessive incen-
tive for an early innovation will subtract too much profit from
the pool for later innovators. To the extent that subsequent in-
novators anticipate smaller prizes for this reason, an excessive
prize could have the same effect on cumulative innovation as an
excessive patent (assuming that subsequent innovators will be
depending in part on the prize system for their profits).
Although the risk of stifling innovation is present in both
systems, some prize advocates argue that the prize system
might help avoid this problem by giving the government greater
flexibility in tailoring the division of profits between sequential
innovators.159 Accordingly, they cite the greater risk of stifling
innovation as a flaw in the incentives for innovation offered by
intellectual property.
3. Flaws in the incentives offered by prizes.
Advocates of the intellectual property system offer a stand-
ard rebuttal to prize scholars' arguments about the superiority
of incentives in a prize system. Namely, the incentives for inno-
vation offered in a prize system are likely to be inferior to the
incentives offered in an intellectual property system because in-
centives under a prize system are not informed by consumers'
willingness to pay.
One of the prize system's fundamental drawbacks compared
to intellectual property is that the government must estimate
the social value of inventions to set their reward without any direct
license new technologies. See, for example, Kieff, 85 Minn L Rev at 705-17 (cited in note
11); Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol at 651-53 (cited in note 8).
158 For this reason, a number of scholars have proposed that a prize system can fos-
ter cumulative innovation. See, for example, Shavell, Foundations at 161-64 (cited in
note 3); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 543 (cited in note 10).
159 See, for example, Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 61 (cited in note
15); Levmore, 93 BU L Rev at 158 (cited in note 16); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1152 (cited
in note 10) (noting that prizes will provide superior incentives for subsequent as well as
complementary inventions because "the developer of the complementary invention will
not have to split its value with the original inventor or take the risk that unresolved pa-
tent disputes with the original inventor will block new complementary products").
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knowledge of consumers' willingness to pay for those inven-
tions.160 Social value is notoriously difficult to measure objectively
in most circumstances, and measuring the social value of inno-
vations-which are unique goods by definition-may be particu-
larly difficult.161 The prize system requires the government to
identify an appropriate measure of social value because the de-
fault measure of social value provided by patents-that is, con-
sumers' willingness to pay-is intentionally eliminated to avoid
deadweight loss. Goods are usually valued by way of the market,
in which individual consumers reveal their demand for goods
through their purchasing decisions. This market-based process
for valuing goods works only in the presence of scarcity, however,
and since inventions are intangible ideas, they are not scarce
goods.162 As discussed above, the patent system introduces artifi-
cial scarcity into the markets for inventions in order to force
consumers to reveal their demand for them, but in doing so, it
prevents consumers from using those inventions at the efficient
level. The prize system eliminates the artificial scarcity created
by patents and thus avoids the deadweight loss from higher con-
sumer prices under intellectual property. 163 However, in the ab-
sence of intellectual property, the government will always have
limited information about consumer demand. Historically, this
was considered by many economists to be the fatal flaw of the
prize system. 64
160 One of the starting premises in the academic literature on prizes is that prize
payouts should be linked to the social value of inventions. See, for example, Gallini and
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 60 (cited in note 15). Accordingly, proposals to replace
patents with prizes usually propose a mechanism for measuring an invention's social
value in order to determine the appropriate prize payout. See, for example, Fisher and
Syed, Prizes at *3 (cited in note 16); Grinols and Henderson, 25 Pharmacoeconomics at
358-60 (cited in note 15); Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 13-16 (cited in
note 19); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1536-39 (cited in note 16); Shavell
and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 531-35 (cited in note 10).
161 See Joseph E. Stiglitz and Scott J. Wallsten, Public-Private Technology Partner-
ships: Promises and Pitfalls, 43 Am Behav Sci 52, 61 (1999) ("Evaluating technology pro-
grams is technically very difficult.").
162 See notes 78-79, 102, and accompanying text.
163 See Barry, 2007 Wis L Rev at 620 (cited in note 16); Chari, Golosov, and Tsyvinski,
147 J Econ Theory at 782 (cited in note 15); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1148 (cited in note
10); Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol at 645 (cited in note 8); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1720 (cited in
note 8).
164 See note 31 and accompanying text. See also Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and
Welfare at 82 n 19 (cited in note 101) (stating that although a policy of '"buying inven-
tions at their social value" could "attain the optimum," "[i]t is unlikely that [this] ideal
solution[ ] would be feasible given the difficulties involved in administering [it]").
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Prize advocates have proposed a number of solutions to the
problem in the form of alternatives for measuring the social value
of an invention. First and foremost, the government can link
prize payouts to sales volume,165 which discloses the number of
consumers who are enjoying the good and provides a data point
for estimating demand.166 The government could then surmise
an innovation's social value by combining the sales-volume data
with an estimate of the innovation's utility to consumers 167-
perhaps based on evidence from consumer surveys about the na-
ture and frequency of its use,168 declared consumer preferences
through voting,169 objective evidence of its utility to the average
165 See Grinols and Henderson, 25 Pharmacoeconomics at 356 (cited in note 15)
(proposing a prize system for drugs in which prizes are based on "an intertemporal bounty
(ongoing payment) that is tied to market sales"); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L &
Econ at 541-42 (cited in note 10) ("[Olne supposes that the government could obtain sig-
nificant information about demand. Most obviously, the government can base its re-
wards on sales data, which should be relatively easy to obtain.").
166 Of course, relying on sales figures can be more complicated when an innovation
is only a small component of the purchased product. See Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at
144 (cited in note 16) ("When inventions cannot be mapped one-to-one onto products, de-
termining the demand for any particular invention may be extraordinarily difficult.").
167 See Abramowicz, Copyrighted Works as Public Goods at *4 (cited in note 20). In
the context of prizes for music:
Download counts provide just one of many means of assessing the popularity of
different recordings, and while the government should be wary of relying ex-
clusively on any single measurement that might be manipulated by authors or
publishers, agencies might be able to develop reasonably accurate assessments
by considering a variety of different proxies and measurement techniques.
Id at *6. See also Shavell, Foundations at 162 (cited in note 3) ("To give rewards that re-
flect the social value of information, the state might base the reward on the volume of
use of the information, such as the sales volume ... and on some measure of its utility
as well."). But see Fisher, Promises to Keep at 234 (cited in note 16) (proposing that prize
payouts for music and movies be based only on utilization rates, not other measurements
of the elasticity of consumer demand, because those other measurements are likely to be
flawed, require politically controversial decisionmaking, and will tilt the incentives for
innovation toward the tastes of the rich).
168 See Eckersley, 18 Harv J L & Tech at 101-02, 143-50 (cited in note 13) (proposing
a prize system for digital information goods in which prize payouts are based on each
consumer's valuation as estimated by their download count, the number of times they
use the good as monitored with software, and voluntary consumer voting); Fisher, Promises
to Keep at 224 (cited in note 16) (proposing a prize system for music and movies in which
the prizes are based on the frequency with which consumers listen to or watch the work);
Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 541-42 (cited in note 10) ('The government
could also attempt to measure more about the demand curve than sales at the market
price; it could estimate demand elasticities and undertake surveys to determine the
character and frequency of use of, for example, computer software, musical recordings,
and cinematic and television productions.").
169 See Eckersley, 18 Harv J L & Tech at 101-02, 143-50 (cited in note 13).
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consumer, 170 or observational studies measuring the social value
it created. 171 An alternative strategy is to introduce a small
amount of artificial scarcity into the market from which to esti-
mate consumer demand-such as through an auction 172 or by
observing profits in a limited test market. 173
Each of the alternative mechanisms proposed for measuring
social value and setting incentives has problems,174 and even
supporters of the prize system acknowledge that the government
cannot accurately estimate consumer demand without intellec-
tual property. However, prize advocates correctly point out that
the government does not need perfect information about con-
sumer demand to set prizes that equal patents at motivating
170 See Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1536-41 (cited in note 16) (propos-
ing a prize system for drugs in which prizes are largely based on a drug's sales volume
and an estimate of its therapeutic value compared to other available treatments).
171 See Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 27-35 (cited in note 19) (pro-
posing a prize system for drugs based on government assessments of each drug's health
impact on the population, an admittedly complicated task that would be accomplished by
combining sales volume with information about therapeutic value from clinical trials,
epidemiological studies, and other relevant sources).
172 See Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1146-48, 1158-62 (cited in note 10) (proposing a
prize system in which the government holds an auction to assess the value of patents
when there is some small chance that the high bidder purchases the patent, but in all
other cases the government pays the innovator double the third-highest bid in the auction).
See also Chari, Golosov, and Tsyvinski, 147 J Econ Theory at 793-98 (cited in note 15).
173 See Guell and Fischbaum, 73 Milbank Q at 225 (cited in note 15) (proposing a
patent buyout regime for pharmaceuticals through the government's power of eminent
domain, and, to assist in assessing the "just compensation" for each patent, allowing "a
market appeal" in which "[tihe drug could be marketed by the firm in a specific test area"
to observe what "the firm's true monopoly profits [would be] had it kept the patent"). But
see Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 135 (cited in note 16) (identifying several potential
problems with Guell and Fischbaum's proposal for limited monopoly pricing in specific
test areas, including that "it might be difficult to extrapolate from the results in the test
market" due to "different demographics from the nation as a whole" and subsequent
changes in consumer demand for the product).
174 A number of articles have criticized one or more of these prize proposals. See, for
example, Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 127-211 (cited in note 16); Baker, Financing
Drug Research at *15-24 (cited in note 19); DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharma-
cology & Therapeutics at 489-90 (cited in note 15); Duffy, 71 U Chi L Rev at 41-51 (cited
in note 16); Kieff, 85 Minn L Rev at 705-17 (cited in note 11). Any effort to measure the
utility of innovations will certainly be crude and sometimes costly to administer. The
proposals to estimate consumer demand with auctions or test markets would also be ex-
pensive, see Kieff, 56 Emory L J at 404 (cited in note 16), and, according to some critics,
unreliable. See, for example, Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 127-211 (cited in note 16);
Kieff, 85 Minn L Rev at 705-17 (cited in note 11). It is probably safer to calculate re-
wards based on sales volume, but this policy might encourage innovators to inflate their
sales figures by setting prices below marginal cost. See notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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innovation. 175 In the patent system, firms invest in R & D based
on their ex ante projections of consumer demand for innovations,
which are likely to be imperfect. For the government to offer
prizes that rival the incentives from patents, its estimates of
consumer demand (which occur ex post) need be only as good as
firms' ex ante projections. 176 Additionally, prize advocates note
that the government has room for error when it estimates social
value for purposes of setting incentives. To the extent that the
private returns from innovation under the patent system are
systematically (and substantially) lower than the social re-
turns, 77 this gap provides the government with a crucial margin
of error when calculating prize payouts. 178
E. The Unifying Theme
The "unifying theme" of the prize literature flows naturally
from the preceding comparison of benefits and drawbacks of a
prize system versus an intellectual property system. The intel-
lectual property system gives the government a default measure
of social value that ties the incentives for innovation to consumers'
willingness to pay. Unfortunately, that measurement of social
value is available only by introducing artificial scarcity into the
market for the innovation, which inevitably creates deadweight
loss. Moreover, the monopoly profits firms might earn from
their inventions do not provide ideal incentives for innovation.
Advocates of the prize system argue that the government could
correct these flaws in the market by switching from intellectual
175 See, for example, Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1140-41 (cited in note 10); Shavell
and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 529-30 (cited in note 10); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at
1706-09 (cited in note 8).
176 See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 542 (cited in note 10).
177 See Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen, 81 Econometrica at 1389 (cited in
note 75).
178 It is plausible to think that, if the government has a well-designed mechanism
for determining rewards, it could offer prizes that are generally higher than what firms
earn from their patents with minimal risk of overcompensating them. In Professor Michael
Kremer's proposed prize system, for example, the government would use an auction
mechanism to estimate the private value of patents, and then pay the inventors twice
the estimated private value to put their patents in the public domain. Kremer, 113 Q J
Econ at 1147 (cited in note 10). Professors Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele ar-
gue that the government could set prizes for inventions by estimating the lower bound of
their social value. They reason that as long as the government has limited information
about consumer demand for an invention (for example, the number of units sold), even
the lowest plausible estimate of its social value will still be higher than firms' anticipated
profits from their patents in most cases. See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at
540-41 (cited in note 10).
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property to prizes. However, without artificial scarcity, the
government must measure social value without knowledge of
consumers' willingness to pay. Society can promote private-
sector R & D while avoiding both drawbacks of intellectual
property so long as the government can set equally good incen-
tives for innovation without using intellectual property to measure
inventions' value to consumers. 179
Accordingly, the literature offers a simple framework for eval-
uating society's choice between prizes and intellectual property.
The unifying theme provides that, if the government can measure
and base its incentives on the social value of an innovation
without consulting intellectual property, then prizes should re-
place patents in order to avoid the deadweight loss attributable
to intellectual property.180 If, as some scholars argue, a prize sys-
tem can offer superior incentives for innovation, that would be a
separate and further reason to replace patents with prizes in
these circumstances. 1 1
II. AN EXCEPTION TO THE UNIFYING THEME?
The unifying conclusion in the prize literature is that, if the
government can set prize payouts to better reflect the social value
of inventions relative to the monopoly profits that firms would
earn from intellectual property, then prizes should replace intel-
lectual property because prizes will reduce deadweight loss and
may offer superior incentives for innovation. If this is true, then
the existence of drug patents in countries with national health
insurance systems presents something of a puzzle. In these
countries, the government sets the incentives for innovation
through a combination of price controls and government reim-
bursement. Drug patents continue to be issued, but the artificial
scarcity that they make possible is never introduced into the
market and, therefore, never consulted by the government in
179 See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 541-42 (cited in note 10).
180 See Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 54 (cited in note 15); Hollis,
An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation at *3-4 (cited in note 15);
Menell and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law at 1476, 1477, 1531-32 (cited in note
32); Stigler, The Organization of Industry at 124 (cited in note 31) ("If a viable system of
lump-sum grants equal to the contribution of a piece of knowledge to the national income
(or welfare) could be devised, there would be a good case for using that system rather
than patents."); Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 691-92 (cited in note 15) (explaining that if
the "informational imbalance is resolved," then "any rationale presented here for choos-
ing patents over other incentives with lower excess burden collapses').
181 See notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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setting incentives. It is possible that these countries are all mak-
ing a mistake, perhaps as a result of undue political influence or
pressure from a foreign power. 8 2 However, an alternative expla-
nation is that the unifying conclusion in the prize literature re-
flects an overly narrow view of the government's options in
achieving the benefits offered by the prize system and of intel-
lectual property's role in preventing expropriation.
All developed countries grant drug patents, but the vast ma-
jority do not use those patents to set market-based incentives for
innovation.183 In these countries, prescription drugs are purchased
and distributed through a national health insurance system.
Citizens are given prescription drug insurance through their
government, which allows them to purchase drugs at the price of
a co-pay instead of the full monopoly price. As the provider of
this insurance, the government reimburses drug companies for
every prescription that is filled at a reimbursement rate "negoti-
ated" with the drug company.14 In reality, the government effec-
tively sets the reimbursement rate given its substantial bargaining
power as the only buyer in the market in that country.
In these countries with nationalized health care, the incen-
tives for drug development are equal to the sum of the co-pays
and reimbursement rates, both of which are set by the govern-
ment. The government cannot rely directly on its drug patents to
inform these incentives, because the measure of social value
provided by patents is never generated. That would require in-
troducing artificial scarcity into the market to reveal consumers'
willingness to pay, and the government largely preempts this
scarcity through its control over prices. Although the companies
182 For example, one might argue that these countries are retaining drug patents
only because they are forced to do so by the nondiscrimination provision in the TRIPS
Agreement. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) (Apr 15, 1994), Art 37(1), 33 ILM 81, 97 (1994). However, most developed coun-
tries expressly supported this nondiscrimination provision in the TRIPS Agreement to
permit drug companies to retain patents. See Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in
Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13 Prometheus 6, 16 (1995).
183 See Livio Garattini, Dante Cornago, and Paola De Compadri, Pricing and Reim-
bursement of In-Patent Drugs in Seven European Countries: A Comparative Analysis, 82
Health Pol 330, 336-37 (2007); Brian Godman, et al, Having Your Cake and Eating It:
Office of Fair Trading Proposal for Funding New Drugs to Benefit Patients and Innova-
tive Companies, 26 Pharmacoeconomics 91, 91-93 (2008); David A. Henry, Suzanne R.
Hill, and Anthony Harris, Drug Prices and Value for Money: The Australian Pharmaceu-
tical Benefits Scheme, 294 JAMA 2630, 2632 (2005); Elias Mossialos, David Brogan, and
Tom Walley, Pharmaceutical Pricing in Europe: Weighing Up the Options, 59 Intl Soc
Security Rev 3, 9-10 (2006).
184 Mossialos, Brogan, and Walley, 59 Intl Soc Security Rev at 6-8 (cited in note 183).
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retain their patents, the actual incentives for drug development
are fully determined by the government-or rather, through
negotiations between the government and pharmaceutical com-
panies-without consulting the drug patents.
The theoretical prize literature suggests that, by not elimi-
nating patents, all of these countries are forgoing substantial
gains in the form of reduced deadweight loss and potentially
improved incentives for innovation. As discussed in Part III.B,
the intellectual property system is generally justified by its ability
to link the rewards for innovation to consumer demand reflected
in consumers' willingness to pay for the invention. However, the
artificial scarcity used to reveal consumers' willingness to pay
inevitably introduces deadweight loss. As a result, the theoreti-
cal literature posits that society will always benefit by switching
to prizes if the incentives set by the government will be no worse
in the absence of intellectual property. When a government does
not consult the intellectual property in setting incentives, it
would seem that the elimination of that intellectual property
cannot worsen incentives. If the incentives set by government
will be no worse, the standard economic account of prizes is clear
that eliminating intellectual property will reduce deadweight
loss by driving down consumer prices.185 Recent prize literature
also claims that eliminating intellectual property in these cir-
cumstances would enable superior incentives for innovation that
more accurately reflect an invention's social value.186
The applied literature on prizes is even more emphatic as to
the gains that these countries are forgoing by not eliminating
patents. Patent scholars regularly give the pharmaceutical in-
dustry as an example of an industry in which patents are caus-
ing substantial deadweight loss,187 resulting in greater potential
for gains from eliminating patents. Prize advocates argue that,
185 See Shavell, Foundations at 162 (cited in note 3); Penin, 34 Rsrch Pol at 645 (cited
in note 8).
186 See notes 175-79. Professor Joseph Stiglitz, for example, writes that "[t]he inno-
vation incentives are strong in the patent system, but they are distorted, whereas the
prize system can provide equivalently strong incentives that are less distorted." Stiglitz,
57 Duke L J at 1724 (cited in note 8). See also Love and Hubbard, 18 Annals Health L at
160 (cited in note 19) ("The use of cash prizes to eliminate legal monopolies for products
provides a powerful opportunity to address several flaws that plague the current system.
In particular, policy makers would have far more freedom to design incentives efficiently.").
187 See, for example, Kieff, 85 Minn L Rev at 731 (cited in note 11); Kremer, 113 Q J
Econ at 1140 (cited in note 10); Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 390 (cited in note
3) (describing patented pharmaceuticals as an "extreme" case of patents conferring sig-
nificant market power); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1701 (cited in note 8).
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if drug patents were eliminated, there would be nothing to stop
generics from quickly entering the market and competing with one
another to drive prices toward marginal cost, facilitating greater
public access. 88 As Professor Joseph Stiglitz explains, "[t]he power
of competitive markets would ensure a wide distribution [of drugs]
at the lowest possible price, unlike the current system, which
uses monopoly power, with its high prices and limited usage."189
If this is true, then countries with nationalized health care are
forgoing substantial gains in public access to drugs by maintaining
drug patents.190
The applied literature also proposes that the superior incen-
tives for innovation offered by prizes are supposed to be particu-
larly impressive in the context of replacing drug patents with
prizes. One of the most frequently cited problems with the re-
wards for innovation under the patent system is the failure to
encourage the R & D of drugs that would primarily benefit
impoverished people in developing countries. 191 While there is
no question of the tremendous social value of developing drugs
for malaria and tuberculosis, it is widely understood that dis-
eases that primarily afflict populations with fewer resources to
pay for treatments receive very little R & D investment by
pharmaceutical firms.192 Advocates of the prize system also point
to the elimination of drug patents in favor of prizes as a unique
opportunity to set superior incentives that discourage wasteful
R & D spending.193 Scholars often accuse pharmaceutical firms
188 See, for example, Joseph Stiglitz, Give Prizes Not Patents, New Scientist 21, 21
(Sept 16, 2006).
189 Stiglitz, 333 BMJ at 1279 (cited in note 28).
190 Scholars have made a similar point by comparing the relative "distortion" that
can be expected when funding pharmaceuticals through prizes as opposed to patents.
See Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *5-6 (cited in note 16) (arguing that the distortion from
monopoly pricing of pharmaceuticals is almost certainly worse than the distortion from
tax revenue funding a prize system).
191 See, for example, William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, Global Justice in
Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 UC Davis L Rev 581, 583
(2007); Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 3-6 (cited in note 19); Stiglitz, 57
Duke L J at 1720-21 (cited in note 8).
192 See, for example, Owen Barder, Michael Kremer, and Heidi Williams, Advance
Market Commitments: A Policy to Stimulate Investment in Vaccines for Neglected Diseases,
Economists' Voice 2-3 (Feb 2006); Berndt, et al, 16 Health Econ at 491 (cited in note
137); DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics at 489-90 (cited
in note 15).
193 See, for example, Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *3 (cited in note 16); Hollis and
Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 91 (cited in note 19); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1148
(cited in note 10); Love and Hubbard, 18 Annals Health L at 172 (cited in note 19);
Stiglitz, New Scientist at 21 (cited in note 188).
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of wasting resources on the development of "me-too" drugs, the
purpose of which is to capture market share away from their com-
petitors,9 while offering little or no advantage over existing prod-
ucts. 195 In a prize system, "[m]e-too drugs that do no better than
existing ones would get a small prize at best.196 Encouraging
socially valuable innovation while discouraging redundant or
wasteful inventions would seemingly be another reason for these
countries in question to eliminate drug patents.
In short, based on the existing prize scholarship, countries
with nationalized health care have every reason to eliminate pa-
tents in favor of prizes. So why are these countries not taking
advantage of the tremendous social gains promised by both theo-
retical and applied prize scholarship, or even seriously discussing
the possibility of eliminating drug patents?
The obvious answer is that the benefits from eliminating
drug patents in these countries would be much smaller than
predicted by the prize literature, and there might not be any
benefits at all. While the prize literature equates intellectual
property with consumers paying full monopoly prices for inven-
tions, these governments are intervening in the market to pro-
vide consumers with access to patented drugs at a much lower
price that is set by the government. The prize literature also
equates intellectual property with market-based incentives for
194 See, for example, Amy Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy:
Evidence from the Vaccine Industry, 119 Q J Econ 527, 555-56 (2004) (finding that, in
response to certain policy changes that increased the potential returns from developing
certain types of vaccines, three of the four vaccines examined may have provided little
additional value and were driven by "socially wasteful business stealing," although the
fourth new vaccine resulted in massive social benefits); Marcia Angell, The Truth about
the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do about It 74-93 (Random
House 2004).
195 See, for example, Angell, The Truth about the Drug Companies at 80-83 (cited in
note 194); Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *9-10 (cited in note 16); Rai, 2001 U Ill L Rev at
205-06 (cited in note 107). Some commentators dispute this claim, however, arguing
that the social value of these "me too" drugs still outweighs their development costs. See,
for example, Albert Wertheimer, Richard Levy, and Thomas O'Connor, Too Many Drugs?
The Clinical and Economic Value of Incremental Innovations, in Irena Farquhar, Kent
Summers, and Alan L. Sorkin, eds, Investing in Health: The Social and Economic Bene-
fits of Health Care Innovation 77, 78-82 (Elsevier 2001); F.M. Scherer, Markets and Un-
certainty in Pharmaceutical Development *20 (Kennedy School of Government Faculty
Research Working Paper Series RWP07-039, Sept 2007), online at
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=267 (visited Aug 12,
2014).
196 Stiglitz, New Scientist at 21 (cited in note 188). See also Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at
1162 (cited in note 10) ("Patent buyouts could potentially increase incentives for original
invention closer to their social value [and] reduce incentives for wasteful 'me too' research.).
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R & D, but these governments can control the profits from
pharmaceutical innovation without reference to consumers'
revealed willingness to pay.
The widespread use of national health insurance systems
and prescription drug coverage in nations that grant drug pa-
tents indicates that the depiction of intellectual property in the
prize literature is flawed. These governments are intervening in
the market to provide consumers with a more efficient level of
access to patented drugs without eliminating those patents.
Moreover, the structure of these policy interventions is eerily
similar to many of the proposals for replacing drug patents with
prizes, which often involve consumers purchasing drugs at their
generic price and governments paying a reward to pharmaceutical
companies based on the sales of their drugs. 197 Since these gov-
ernments already exercise a tremendous amount of control over
the profits from pharmaceutical R & D, it is unclear why they
must eliminate drug patents in order to alter the incentives for
drug development in a beneficial manner. Moreover, since
pharmaceutical companies have fought to preserve the drug pa-
tent system in these countries,198 it is possible that patents play
an important role in the incentives for innovation even when the
government controls the market.
Ultimately, the decision of the vast majority of developed
countries to retain drug patents while not using them to set
market-based rewards for innovation may well be the logical
choice. In any case, the fact that none of these countries have
chosen to eliminate patents suggests that there is more going on
in the analysis than suggested by the unifying principle. Even if
the incentives for innovation will be no worse when set by the
government in the absence of intellectual property, other factors
may still justify preserving patents in favor of prizes.
III. REVISITING THE PROMISE OF REDUCTIONS IN DEADWEIGHT
LOSS
The central advantage of the prize system is supposed to be
that it reduces deadweight loss by allowing for efficient consumer
pricing of inventions. Despite the recent surge of scholarship on
prizes, there has been no systematic analysis of the prize system's
197 See Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1534-43 (cited in note 16).
198 See Arthur A. Daemmrich, Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulation in the United
States and Germany 2 (North Carolina 2004).
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likely effects on consumer prices. 199 This gap in the literature
leaves a significant hole in the case for the prize system. Improved
access is a powerful selling point for replacing intellectual prop-
erty with prizes since consumer deadweight loss is one of the
primary drawbacks of the intellectual property system. However,
to the extent that the deadweight loss associated with intel-
lectual property is alleviated by other means available within
that system, the incremental improvement of eliminating intel-
lectual property in favor of prizes will be reduced. Moreover, to
the extent that the deadweight loss is attributable to forces other
than patents, the elimination of intellectual property in favor of
prizes will similarly offer limited gains to society in reducing
deadweight loss.
A. Reassessing the Inevitability of Deadweight Loss in an
Intellectual Property System
This Section examines some of the tools available-and in
many cases already used-within an intellectual property sys-
tem that can help mitigate the deadweight loss associated with
monopoly pricing of inventions. This examination leads to two
important insights for the comparison between intellectual
property and prizes. First, under many circumstances, the tools
available within an intellectual property system can be fairly ef-
fective at providing consumers access to patented or copyrighted
goods at prices close or equal to marginal cost. Second, the pric-
ing structure for inventions created through these tools closely
resembles the pricing structure imagined in many proposals for
a prize system. In the prize literature, scholars commonly char-
acterize prizes as a means of "de-linking" consumer prices from
producer prices, thereby separating the incentives for innovation
from the prices consumers must pay for access to inventions.200
However, markets often produce their own version of this price
structure through a particular form of price discrimination
known as a "two-part tariff." Notably, it is found in the very in-
dustries that have received the most attention from prize advo-
cates-the pharmaceutical and entertainment industries. While
a two-part tariff alone is incapable of fully eliminating the
deadweight loss attributable to intellectual property, much of what
remains can be eliminated with other tools at the government's
199 See note 20.
200 Love, De-linking R&D Costs from Product Prices at *2-3 (cited in note 54).
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disposal, including taxes, subsidies, and price controls. Exam-
ples of subsidies familiar to most people in the United States are
government-subsidized health care and consumer tax credits for
energy-efficient technologies. Moreover, the government can
simply purchase inventions on behalf of consumers, which is a
common strategy for reducing deadweight loss attributable to
drug patents, as discussed in Part II.
1. Prizes as a two-part pricing scheme for the elimination
of deadweight loss.
At a basic level, the prize system is a two-part pricing
scheme for inventions, in which the government pays firms a
reward for their inventions and consumers pay to cover the costs
of their use. Among economists, it is well accepted that this type
of two-part pricing can allow for efficient access to goods with
large fixed costs of production, such as utilities, public infra-
structure,2 01 and inventions with high R & D costs. 20 2 As Profes-
sor Burton Weisbrod explains, "when R&D costs are very large
relative to production costs-as is the case for pharmaceuticals-
using price for pills as the only mechanism for rewarding the
product developer drives price upward," causing it to be "far
higher than is economically efficient.203 Along with most other
prize advocates, Weisbrod concludes that "[t]he patent system is
the root problem," because "the only way that R&D, including
clinical testing, costs can be covered is through high prices for
the resulting pills.204 The prize system is a natural solution to
this problem because, as prize advocates routinely point out, it
"de-link[s] R&D costs from product prices.205 Professor Kenneth
201 See Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation
and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 Econometrica 242, 242-43 (1938).
202 See Romer, 92 Am Econ Rev at 214 (cited in note 15).
203 Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, Wash Post at A21 (cited in note 15).
204 Id. See also Arrow, Allocation of Resources for Innovation at 617 (cited in note 4)
(explaining that "[iun a free enterprise economy" that encourages innovation with pa-
tents rather than prizes, "inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create
property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization
of the information").
205 Love, De-linking R&D Costs from Product Prices at *2-3 (cited in note 54).
Among global-health scholars, it is now standard practice to refer to prize systems and
similar proposals for replacing (or limiting) drug patents as "de-linking" initiatives for
"divorcing the funding of R&D from product pricing." Consultative Expert Working
Group on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination, Research and Devel-
opment to Meet Health Needs in Developing Counties: Strengthening Global Financing
and Coordination, 37-38, 49-63 (World Health Organization 2012). See also Meir Perez
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Arrow made the same observation back in 1962, stating that
"[iln an ideal socialist economy, the reward for invention would
be completely separated from any charge to the users of the in-
formation," as "exists in the Soviet Union" with its prize system.20 6
Weisbrod even describes his proposed prize system simply as a
regime of "[t]wo prices--one for the R&D, another for the resulting
pills."207 This literature makes a strong case for separating the
reward for innovation from consumer prices.
2. Intellectual property along with two-part price
discrimination for the reduction of deadweight loss.
The literature on prizes often overlooks the fact that intel-
lectual property rights permit innovators to sell inventions
through a type of two-part pricing that is similar in form to prizes
and that can lessen (but not eliminate) the deadweight loss from
monopoly pricing.208 It is widely accepted that intellectual prop-
erty rights cause deadweight loss, which firms have an incentive
to reduce by offering discounts to consumers who otherwise
would exit the market at monopoly prices. The standard eco-
nomic account of intellectual property recognizes that price dis-
crimination can reduce and, theoretically, even eliminate
deadweight loss, but is very difficult to implement in practice.209
One particular type of price discrimination-the two-part tariff-
warrants special attention, however. Under a two-part tariff,
consumers pay the monopolist an upfront fee in exchange for the
right to purchase units of the good at a specified price. The classic
example of a two-part pricing scheme is Disneyland, where con-
sumers pay an upfront fee to get into the park, but once inside
Pugatch, Rachel Chu, and David Torstensson, Assembling the Pharmaceutical R&D Puz-
zle for Needs in the Developing World 24-25 (Pugatch Consilium 2012); Adrian Towse, et
al, Drugs and Vaccines for Developing Countries *27-28 (Office of Health Economics May
21, 2011), online at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-dbrl/research/developing-Oxford.pdf
(visited Aug 12, 2014).
206 Arrow, Allocation of Resources for Invention at 617 & n 5 (cited in note 4).
207 Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, Wash Post at A21 (cited in note 15).
208 An exception is Profesor John Duffy's 2004 article on prizes, in which he briefly
notes that "monopolists are free to rely on 'multi-part' pricing, by which lower charges
would be made for incremental units." Duffy, 71 U Chi L Rev at 45 (cited in note 16).
However, Duffy offers no other discussion of multipart pricing other than to say that "[i]f
the monopolist can engage in perfect price discrimination, no deadweight loss will occur."
Id at 46. As explained below, eliminating deadweight loss through two-part pricing alone
is impossible unless consumer demand for the invention is homogeneous, and it never is.
See notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
209 See notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
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they have access to the individual rides for free-a price that
approximates the marginal cost of taking a ride.210 Disney has a
monopoly over each of the rides in Disneyland, but with the two-
part tariff, consumers who pay the upfront fee enjoy access to
those rides at the efficient level. The entrance fee causes
deadweight loss as some consumers are priced out of Disney-
land, but the consumers inside the park completely avoid the
deadweight loss normally associated with monopoly pricing.211
Although the intellectual property literature rarely men-
tions this form of price discrimination, two-part tariffs are a
common pricing strategy with patented and copyrighted goods.
Online music services like Rhapsody charge monthly subscrip-
tion fees for unlimited, on-demand access to large collections of
songs.212 Universities pay subscription fees to various online data-
bases so that their faculty and students can enjoy unfettered ac-
cess to journal articles.213 Consumers pay an upfront fee to their
cable company or companies such as Netflix and Amazon for un-
limited viewing of the television and movie programming in
their bundle.214 Some industry patent pools offer firms free or
low-cost access to patented technologies in exchange for an up-
front fee.215 In each case, consumers pay a lump-sum fee in ex-
change for access to patented or copyrighted goods at prices at or
near marginal cost.
The most noteworthy example of two-part tariff pricing for
a patented technology is prescription drug insurance. When
consumers buy prescription drug insurance, they pay an upfront
fee (in the form of an insurance premium) that enables them to
purchase drugs at the price of their co-pay. To the extent that
co-pays for drugs resemble marginal cost-and they are often
210 See Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse
Monopoly, 85 Q J Econ 77, 77-81 (1971).
211 See id at 86-88.
212 See Rhapsody-Play Any Song, Anywhere (Rhapsody International), online at
http://try.rhapsody.com (visited Aug 12, 2014).
213 See Steven Shavell, Should Copyright of Academic Works Be Abolished?, 2 J Le-
gal Analysis 301, 328 (2010) ("Today, universities subscribe to a large number of journals
and make their content freely available to many in the university community through
library and Internet access.").
214 See Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity
and Efficiency of Bundles in New Technology Markets, 5 J Competition L & Econ 1, 32-
35 (2009).
215 See id at 22-24.
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fairly close216--consumers with insurance enjoy efficient access
to prescription drugs.27 As a result, the widespread use of pre-
scription drug insurance in the United States dramatically reduces
the deadweight loss from drug patents 218--an area in which
scholars often assume that the deadweight loss from patents is
greatest.2 19
Although the benefits can be significant, two-part tariffs are
not a cure for the deadweight loss caused by intellectual property.
For consumers who pay the initial fee, the basic structure of
pricing through a two-part tariff is remarkably similar to the
two-part pricing under a prize system.220 However, the people
who fail to pay the upfront fee are either excluded from the
market or, if they can still purchase the goods individually (like
216 See Darius Lakdawalla and Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance as a Two-Part Pric-
ing Contract, 102 J Public Econ 1, 9 (2013). Under the modern practice of tiered formu-
laries, however, consumers often face high co-pays for expensive prescription drugs when
there are lower-cost alternatives. See Jesse D. Malkin, Dana P. Goldman, and Geoffrey
F. Joyce, The Changing Face of Pharmacy Benefit Design, 23 Health Affairs 194, 196
(2004).
217 See Michael Crew, Coinsurance and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 59
Am Econ Rev 906, 906 (1969) ("Where monopoly or some restriction of competition exists
in the servicing of liability claims, coinsurance may lead to a Pareto optimal situation.");
Martin Gaynor, Deborah Haas-Wilson, and William B. Vogt, Are Invisible Hands Good
Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets, 108 J
Polit Econ 992, 1001-02 (2000); Lakdawalla and Sood, 102 J Public Econ at 1 (cited in
note 216) ("[H]ealth insurance resembles a two-part pricing contract in the sense that
consumers pay an upfront fee (premiums) in exchange for lower unit prices (co-
payments) in the event of illness," which "allow[s] a monopolist to sell goods at marginal
cost, but to extract consumer surplus in the form of an upfront payment."). See also Alan
M. Garber, Charles I. Jones, and Paul Romer, Insurance and Incentives for Medical In-
novation, 9 F Health Econ & Pol 1, 17-21 (2006).
218 See Lakdawalla and Sood, 102 J Pub Econ at 2 (cited in note 216) (arguing that
health insurance can eliminate the deadweight loss from patent protection on pharma-
ceuticals by allowing consumers to purchase drugs at marginal cost). See also Fisher,
Intellectual Property and Innovation at *12 (cited in note 16) ("Public or private health-
insurance systems can, of course, offset [the potential deadweight loss from high drug
prices] by enabling the cost of patented drugs to be passed along either to all taxpayers
•.. or to large populations of potential patients.").
219 See note 101. See also Guell and Fischbaum, 73 Milbank Q at 216-20 (cited in
note 15).
220 The close relationship between prizes and two-part tariffs is especially obvious in
the case of prescription drugs. Both approaches involve consumers paying an intermedi-
ary in exchange for having access to prescription drugs at lower prices, and both rely on
that intermediary to pay drug companies to compensate them for the value of their
products to consumers. The initial fee in a two-part tariff is similar to the higher taxes
that consumers would pay to finance government prize payouts, and once they pay that
fee, they would have access to the inventions at a price that is often close to marginal
cost, much like a prize system.
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people without prescription-drug insurance), they suffer the
normal deadweight loss from a single-price monopoly.221
If consumer demand were homogenous, two-part tariffs
would result in a first-best outcome: firms would set their up-
front fee at the monopoly price, which everyone would pay, and
then sell their goods to consumers at marginal cost.222 Consumer
demand is almost never homogenous, of course, and with hetero-
geneity, monopolists will either set the second part of the tariff
above marginal cost, or, more commonly, charge an upfront fee
that excludes some consumers from the market.223 In practice,
therefore, two-part tariffs can only lessen the inefficiencies of
monopoly pricing.
3. Government subsidies and price controls for further
reductions in deadweight loss.
The inefficiencies of monopoly pricing that persist in a two-
part tariff system can be further reduced with other tools al-
ready available to the government, such as subsidies and price
controls.
a) Government subsidies can reduce deadweight loss in the
intellectual property system. The most familiar means of elimi-
nating deadweight loss without eliminating intellectual property
is the use of government subsidies. The government can subsi-
dize the purchase price of patented and copyrighted innovations
so that consumers' out of pocket costs are much closer to marginal
221 See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Economic Problems Facing Fami-
lies *3-4 (Kaiser Public Opinion Apr 2008), online at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2013/01/7773.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014). According to figures published
by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 15.5 percent of people living in the United States were
uninsured in 2010. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Uninsured Estimates of
the Total Population, American Community Survey (ACS), State Health Facts (2010),
online at http://kff.org/uninsured/state-indicator/total-population-2 (visited Aug 12,
2014). Many more are likely underinsured.
222 See Oi, 85 Q J Econ at 81-88 (cited in note 210); Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination,
in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization
598, 601-10 (Elsevier 1989).
223 See Varian, Price Discrimination at 604-10 (cited in note 222); Tirole, The Theory
of Industrial Organization at 143-46 (cited in note 5). Monopolists tend to charge a
higher upfront fee, rather than set the second part of the tariff above marginal cost. This
is because it is generally more profitable to maximize the enjoyment of those who do enter
and charge a commensurately greater upfront fee than it is to increase the number of
people who enter but limit use by charging more than the marginal rate.
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costs.224 The government has substantial flexibility in structuring
subsidies that will reduce deadweight loss without eliminating
intellectual property. As Professor Doug Lichtman argued in re-
sponse to proposals for replacing drug patents with prizes, "the
government could significantly reduce the social cost of pharma-
ceutical patents simply by offering a cash subsidy to any con-
sumer who values a patented drug above its marginal cost but is
nonetheless unwilling to pay the monopoly price.225
Government subsidies can be particularly effective at reducing
the deadweight loss from intellectual property-and are probably
more practical-when used in conjunction with a two-part-tariff
pricing model. For example, the government can-and, in some
cases, already does-subsidize consumers' purchase of health in-
surance. Scholars have noted that government-subsidized drug
insurance may be a cost-effective means of eliminating
deadweight loss attributable to drug patents while maintaining
intellectual property.26 As Professor Arti Rai explains, "subsidies
directed at providing insurance for the uninsured could elimi-
nate deadweight loss by giving all individuals the benefit of this
price discrimination."227 The government can also subsidize con-
sumers' purchasing power by directly paying the consumer
purchasing the subsidized innovation. Consumer tax credits
for energy-efficient technologies are a common form of such
payments.22 8
The government can even subsidize consumers' purchasing
power by directly paying the innovator for each sale of their pa-
tented or copyrighted product. The purpose of such subsidies is
224 See Lichtman, 11 Harv J L & Tech at 124-25 (cited in note 16). But see Barry,
2007 Wis L Rev at 609-19 (cited in note 16) (arguing that consumer subsidies are not a
viable alternative to a prize system that eliminates intellectual property rights).
225 Lichtman, 11 Harv J L & Tech at 124-25 (cited in note 16).
226 See, for example, DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics
at 488 (cited in note 15) ("The underconsumption produced by patents for this uninsured
population, however, can be remedied by taking the much less radical step of insuring
the uninsured (at co-payments or co-insurance rates that approximate marginal produc-
tion costs), rather than replacing patents and their market exclusivities with prize
funds.").
227 Rai, 2001 U Ill L Rev at 179 (cited in note 107). Rai continues, 'Moreover, as con-
trasted with buyouts [of drug patents by the government] ... subsidies specifically di-
rected at providing insurance to the uninsured would require a relatively small commit-
ment of tax revenue." Id.
228 See, for example, US Department of Energy, Tax Credits, Rebates, and Savings,
online at http://www.energy.gov/taxbreaks.htm (visited Aug 12, 2014) (listing the various
tax credits available for energy-efficient technologies under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009).
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to induce the patent holder to voluntarily lower prices toward
marginal cost in order to increase sales and collect additional
subsidies from the government. Economists have discussed the
possibility of subsidizing public utilities in this way to induce
marginal cost pricing since the 1930s.229
b) Government subsidies plus price controls can reduce
deadweight loss in the intellectual property system. Another
means of eliminating deadweight loss without eliminating intel-
lectual property is for the government to purchase inventions on
behalf of consumers and perhaps require consumers to pay a
smaller price that resembles marginal cost. In operation, this
system involves the government supplementing the price paid
by consumers through direct payments to the innovator for each
sale of the patented or copyrighted product, along with price
controls for both consumers and innovators. Unlike the subsi-
dies just discussed, which are meant to induce voluntary mar-
ginal cost pricing by the intellectual property holder, price con-
trols impose a mandatory price at a rate approximating the
government's estimate of marginal cost. And unlike a prize sys-
tem, the government cannot rely on competition to set a more
efficient consumer price. However, if the government can suc-
cessfully set the consumer price at (or relatively close to) mar-
ginal cost, then it can generate efficient consumer pricing while
retaining intellectual property.
As discussed in Part II, most developed countries use this
approach to provide citizens with access to prescription drugs
through nationalized health care, while retaining intellectual
property. The government sets consumer prices for drugs at a
specified co-pay, and then the pharmaceutical companies are
paid based on sales volume at a reimbursement rate negotiated
by the government as the only buyer in a monopsony. 230
229 See, for example, R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 Economica 169,
169-70 (1946); Mark Armstrong and David E.M. Sappington, Recent Developments in the
Theory of Regulation, in Mark Armstrong and Rob Porter, eds, 3 Handbook of Industrial
Organization 1560, 1562-65 (Elsevier 2007). Since subsidies could drive up innovators'
profits and possibly provide excessive incentives for innovation, the government might
need to levy a lump-sum tax on innovators to offset some of their gains. See Barry, 2007
Wis L Rev at 609-14 (cited in note 16). Alternatively, the government may be able to
avoid any need for a lump-sum tax if, as Lichtman proposes, the government targets its
subsidies at consumer purchases that monopoly pricing would otherwise prevent. See
Lichtman, 11 Harv J L & Tech at 124-25 (cited in note 16).
230 See note 184.
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Of course, when the government sets both the reimburse-
ment rate and the consumer price, the incentive for innovation
is fully determined by the government without regard to con-
sumers' willingness to pay. Thus, with government purchases
and price controls, the government mitigates deadweight loss by
ignoring what most economists still consider the primary benefit
of offering patents-a beacon for setting incentives informed by
consumers' willingness to pay. The result is a patent system in
which incentives are no better informed by consumer demand
than in a prize system.23' Moreover, consumer prices are likely
worse informed than in a prize system, which has the benefit of
market competition to determine the marginal price to be paid
by consumers.
B. Reassessing the Projected Gains from Price Competition in
a Prize System
Given these various strategies for avoiding the deadweight
loss associated with intellectual property, the potential gains
from switching to the prize system will often be much smaller
than prize advocates imagine. However, if the prize system can
achieve prices closer to marginal cost than is possible under an
intellectual property regime, then prizes still enjoy a fundamental
advantage over intellectual property.
Prize advocates argue that abolishing intellectual property
will always increase the efficiency of consumer prices because
doing so allows for greater price competition in the markets for
innovations.232 However, the competition necessary to drive
down prices is obstructed when firms possess trade secrets and
know-how related to their innovations that give them an ad-
vantage over competitors even without intellectual property. A
variety of markets are affected by other barriers to entry, such
as FDA regulations, that would continue to insulate innovators
from significant price competition even after the elimination of
patents. Large fixed costs of production and economies of scale
can similarly prevent consumer prices from falling to marginal
cost. The potential for price competition to reduce consumer
231 Indeed, in the debate whether to replace drug patents with prizes, several scholars
have noted that calculating the prize payment is no different from setting the reim-
bursement rate under a government-run insurance system. See, for example, Love and
Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1541 (cited in note 16); Hollis, An Efficient Reward Sys-
tem for Pharmaceutical Innovation at *2 (cited in note 15).
232 See note 116.
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prices may also be hindered by market distortions that are in-
troduced in the implementation of a prize system. For example,
financing the prize system through government-imposed user
fees can reintroduce deadweight loss. Moreover, tying prize pay-
outs to sales volume can create an incentive for innovators to
sell their inventions below marginal cost, and the only means of
preventing this proposed to date may have the counterproduc-
tive effect of increasing marginal cost.
The appeal of relying on competition to set consumer prices
is obvious, but as shown below, the competition permitted
through the elimination of intellectual property will often leave
a significant gap between consumer prices and marginal cost.
Depending on the size of that gap, the pricing strategies out-
lined in Part III.A may result in consumer prices that fall closer
to marginal cost than they would under a prize system.
1. Barriers to market entry and price competition other
than intellectual property.
The prize system uses competition to push consumer prices
closer to marginal cost. Without an intellectual property right,
innovators would be unable to use the courts to stop competitors
from copying their ideas. In the absence of some other barrier to
imitation, competitors could enter the market and sell goods to
consumers that are either close or perfect substitutes for the in-
novation. The resulting price competition would make it difficult
for innovators to command any premium in the sale of their
products. In a scenario of perfect competition, prices would fall
to average production costs, which are generally assumed to be
close or equal to marginal cost.2 33 However, perfect competition
is rare for reasons that have little to do with the intellectual
property system.234 Indeed, critics of intellectual property are the
first to note that eliminating patents and copyrights would not
233 See, for example, Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1154 (cited in note 10); Shavell and
van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 529, 545 (cited in note 10); Stiglitz, 57 Duke L J at 1720
(cited in note 8).
234 See Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 384 (cited in note 3) (explaining that
"real-world markets are almost never purely and perfectly competitive," and that even
without intellectual property, innovations might not be sold at marginal cost because of
"natural imitation lags, the advantages of competitive product leadership, and the exist-
ence of non-patent barriers to the emergence of a competitive market structure"); Tirole,
The Theory of Industrial Organization at 8-11 (cited in note 5).
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reduce the profits from innovation to zero.2 35 The potential wel-
fare gains from eliminating intellectual property in favor of
prizes may be limited in a number of circumstances.
When intellectual property is just one of many barriers to
entry in a particular market, the prize system may fail to intro-
duce substantial price competition, and the efficiency gains in
consumer pricing will be more modest. As a result, the benefits
from switching to a prize system depend on the significance of
intellectual property relative to the other barriers to entry in the
market.
Innovators often possess trade secrets and informational
advantages related to the use of their inventions even without
intellectual property. Despite the purported "disclosure func-
tion" of patents, firms frequently retain important information
about their patented inventions as trade secrets and know-
how. 236 Professor Karl Jorda observes that "[a]s a practical matter,
licenses under patents without access[] to associated or collat-
eral know-how are often not enough for commercial use of the
patented technology. 237 If the disclosure of technical information
under the prize system is similar to that under patents, most
235 See, for example, Boldrin and Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly at 61-62
(cited in note 84).
236 Note, 118 Harv L Rev at 2024-25 (cited in note 130).
237 Karl F. Jorda, Intellectual Property Valuation: The Legal Counterpart/Counterpoint,
8 Arellano L & Pol Rev 31, 33-34 (2007). Jorda continues:
Hence, data and know-how are immensely important. In this regard, let me
cite the following persuasive comments:
" "In many cases, particularly in chemical technology, the know-how is the
most important part of a technology transfer agreement." (Homer
Blair).
" "Acquire not just the patents but the rights to the know-how. Access to
experts and records, lab notebooks, and reports on pilot-scale opera-
tions, including data on markets and potential users of the technology
are crucial." (Robert Ebish).
" "It is common practice in industry to seek and obtain patents on that
part of a technology that is amenable to patent protection, while main-
taining related technological data and other information in confidence.
Some regard a patent as little more than an advertisement for the sale
of accompanying know-how." (Peter Rosenberg).
" In technology licensing, "related patent rights generally are mentioned
late in the discussion and are perceived to have 'insignificant' value rel-
ative to the know-how." (Michael Ward, Honeywell VP Licensing).
" 'Trade secrets are a component of almost every technology license ...
(and) can increase the value of a license up to 3 to 10 times the value of
the deal if no trade secrets are involved." (Melvin Jager).
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firms will retain valuable trade secrets and know-how related to
their innovations after they receive a prize. As long as firms
maintain control over that knowledge, they can use it to set the
price of their innovations above marginal cost.
The regulatory barriers to entry in certain industries could
present an even greater impediment to price competition. Gov-
ernment agencies like the FDA and the EPA often prohibit firms
from selling product innovations without first satisfying stringent
safety standards.238 For manufacturers of vaccines,239 biologic
drugs,240 and diagnostic and medical devices, 241 the regulatory
approval process dramatically increases the costs of copying other
firms' innovations. As a result, expiring intellectual property
rights often have little effect on prices in these industries.242 In
other related industries, however, including small-molecule
drugs,243 agrochemicals,244 and food additives, 245 patent expira-
tion can have a dramatic effect on price because competitors are
exempt from much of the regulatory approval process. 246
238 See US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Innovation and Commercial-
ization of Emerging Technologies *64-65 (GPO Sept 1995), online at http://ota.fas.org/
reports/9539.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
239 See Eileen Salinsky and Cole Werble, The Vaccine Industry: Does It Need a Shot
in the Arm? *23 (background paper, National Health Policy Forum, Jan 25, 2006), online at
http://www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BPVaccinelndustry-01-25-06.pdf (visited
Aug 12, 2014).
240 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 7001-03, Pub L No 111-148,
124 Stat 119, 127-28 (2010).
241 See 21 USC § 360e.
242 See Glennerster and Kremer, 23 Reg at 38 (cited in note 41) (noting that, in the
vaccine market, "given the technical complexity of manufacturing vaccines and the arduous
process of securing regulatory approval, competition might not be intense even if patents
were put in the public domain"); Federal Trade Commission, Emerging Health Care
Issues: Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition iii-iv (June 2009) (concluding that "[tihe
substantial costs to obtain FDA approval, plus the substantial fixed costs to develop
manufacturing capacity, will likely limit the number of competitors that undertake entry
with [follow-on biologic] products" to just "two to three" on average "to compete with a par-
ticular pioneer biologic drug") (emphasis omitted).
243 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich
Telecomm & Tech L Rev 345, 856-59 (2007).
244 See CropLife International, On the Protection of Safety and Efficacy Data for
Existing and New Crop Protection Chemicals *2 (position paper, Jan 15, 2008), online at
http://dijkwdgw723xjf.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Position-Paper-The
-Protection-of-safety-and-efficacy-data-for-existing-and-new-crop-protection-
chemicals.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
245 See Peter Barton Hutt, Regulation of Food Additives in the United States, in A. Larry
Branen, et al, eds, Food Additives 199, 213-14 (Marcel Dekker 2d ed 2002).
246 See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability,
87 Tex L Rev 503, 510-11 (2009).
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2. Fixed costs of production and economies of scale.
Anytime there are fixed costs and economies of scale in pro-
ducing an innovation, the prize system cannot bring about mar-
ginal cost pricing. In a perfectly competitive market, competitors
will enter and drive down prices, 247 but only up to the point at
which they still expect to recover their overall investment. In
addition to the variable costs of producing each unit of the good,
these firms may have incurred start-up costs when they entered
the market (for example, equipment, facilities, training, and
business licenses), and there may be other fixed costs during
production (for example, overhead and salaries for nonhourly
workers). Since firms must expect a return on these invest-
ments, entry does not occur until the price exceeds the average
total production costs of the marginal entering firm. Marginal
cost pricing, on the other hand, would reflect only the difference
in variable costs with the production of each additional unit of
the innovation. Whenever there are fixed costs in production or
economies of scale, therefore, the prize system cannot achieve
marginal cost pricing.
This observation is more pertinent to some technologies
than others. There are no real fixed costs associated with online
file sharing of music and books, so marginal costs and average
total production costs are about the same. 248 In contrast, due to
the immense fixed costs of producing vaccines and biologic
drugs,249 the generic price of those drugs under a prize system
would be much higher than their marginal cost. The case for the
prize system is stronger for small-molecule drugs, but even
247 It is possible that eliminating intellectual property would spur innovation in
production processes, ultimately lowering the marginal costs of production over time. In
a market with limited product differentiation and increased price competition, there
might be additional pressure on firms to lower their production costs, perhaps resulting
in more innovation that, over time, reduces average production costs. See Arrow, Alloca-
tion of Resources for Invention at 609 (cited in note 4). But see Edmund Kitch, The Na-
ture and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L & Econ 265, 275-80 (1977) (arguing that,
compared to competition, a monopolist that is able to coordinate the development of an
invention will invest optimally in that development effort).
248 Goods that can be reproduced and distributed as digital files-for example, mu-
sic, films, books, and software-would likely achieve the ideal result of marginal cost
pricing in a prize system. There are almost no limits on production capacity in the repro-
duction and dissemination of digital files, and the variable costs are near zero. Without
the intellectual property system (or digital encryption technology), these goods could all
be posted on the Internet and downloaded for free. See Fisher, Intellectual Property and
Innovation at *23-25 (cited in note 16).
249 See note 239.
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there, prices would not fall to marginal cost. For most brand
name, small-molecule drugs, the cost of goods sold is roughly 20
to 30 percent of their gross sales receipts.250 Many of these costs
are fixed, such as building manufacturing facilities and having
them certified by regulators.251 Generic manufacturers face simi-
lar fixed costs in their production process. 252 Assuming perfect
competition in the absence of intellectual property, prices should
fall to the total average cost of generic manufacturers, not their
marginal cost of producing each pill. Given the large fixed costs
of manufacturing drugs, the generic price for a drug might be
noticeably higher than its marginal cost.
3. Reinstating deadweight loss with user fees.
When the government calculates prize payouts based on
sales volume, it faces an incentive to save money by imposing a
sales tax on innovations, with the effect of reintroducing
deadweight loss. Most proposals for prize systems rely on ob-
serving sales volume to calculate prizes.253 Given the close con-
nection between the utilization of an innovation and its social
value, it is hard to imagine a comprehensive prize system that
does anything else.264 Unfortunately, basing rewards on sales
volume gives the government a perverse incentive to suppress
utilization as a way to reduce its own liabilities.255 The govern-
ment could use a variety of means to limit the public's access at
250 See Pradeep Suresh and Prabir K. Basu, Improving Pharmaceutical Product
Development and Manufacturing: Impact on Cost of Drug Development and Cost of
Goods Sold of Pharmaceuticals, 3 J Pharmaceutical Innovation 175, 185 (2008).
251 See id at 178-82; Prabir Basu, et al, Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Phar-
maceutical Companies, 3 J Pharmaceutical Innovation 30, 31 (2008).
252 See Basu, et al, 3 J Pharmaceutical Innovation at 34-37 (cited in note 251).
253 See, for example, Chari, Golosov, and Tsyvinski, 147 J Econ Theory at 793, 797
(cited in note 15); Fisher, Promises to Keep at 224 (cited in note 16); Grinols and Henderson,
25 Pharmacoeconomics at 356 (cited in note 15); Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact
Fund at 29-31 (cited in note 19); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1532 (cited in
note 16); Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 540-42 (cited in note 10).
254 In theory, the government could set prize payouts based on predicted utilization
rates rather than ex post sales figures. Professor Michael Kremer's proposal for patent
buyouts is an example, since he would have the government valuate patents through an
auction that elicits information about expected monopoly profits. See Kremer, 113 Q J
Econ at 1146-48 (cited in note 10). However, he also acknowledges that the government
might need to use observed sales figures to ensure that it does not overpay for patents.
See id at 1159-60.
255 See William P. Rogerson, Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Pro-
cess, 8 J Econ Persp 65, 81 (1994).
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marginal cost,256 but the most direct is to impose user fees on in-
novations to inflate their price, thereby suppressing sales vol-
ume while also raising money to help finance the prize system. 57
From the public's perspective, these user fees are harmful to the
extent that they undermine some (or all) of the efficiency gains
from the prize system. Nevertheless, so long as the government
is operating under budget constraints and calculates prizes
based on sales volume, it will have a strong incentive to sup-
press the utilization of innovations though a sales tax or similar
user fee.
4. Increasing the marginal costs of innovation.
Linking prize payouts to sales volume can, under the right
circumstances, make it profitable for firms to sell their inven-
tions at a price below marginal cost (or engage in excessive mar-
keting), since the resulting increase in sales would boost their
prize receipts.268 The problem with below-marginal-cost pricing
is twofold. When society purchases the invention for persons
who value it at less than its marginal cost, the result is a net
loss from the public's perspective, calling into question the as-
serted superiority of prizes over intellectual property at provid-
ing optimal access to innovation. Moreover, selling inventions
below marginal cost corrupts the reliability of sales volume as a
signal of the social value of innovations, undermining one of the
most trustworthy measures for setting prize payouts. 259
Unfortunately, preventing below-marginal-cost pricing is dif-
ficult due to the challenges facing the government in observing
256 Governments with national health insurance systems use a variety of techniques
to limit prescription drug use to fit within the system's budgetary constraints, including
restrictive formularies, prescribing guidelines, prescribing budgets for physicians or hos-
pitals, and marketing restrictions. See US Department of Commerce, Pharmaceutical
Price Controls in OECD Countries at *7-9 (cited in note 47).
257 See Sarah Thomson and Elias Mossialos, Influencing Demand for Drugs through
Cost Sharing, in Elias Mossialos, Monique Mrazek, and Tom Walley, eds, Regulating
Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Striving for Efficiency, Equity, and Quality 227, 227-44
(Open 2004) (describing the use of co-pays and other cost-sharing mechanisms in OECD
countries to reduce government spending on prescription drugs).
258 See Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 34 (cited in note 19); Shavell
and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 540 n 35 (cited in note 10).
259 See Yu, 76 U Colo L Rev at 708 (cited in note 16) (noting that, under a prize sys-
tem for music in which prizes are based on download counts, "[flans are able to abuse the
system by repeatedly downloading songs of their favorite artists or by inflating download
counts using 'ballot-stuffing' programs or mistaken identities").
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marginal costs.260 This is true of most innovations, the majority of
which are manufactured and distributed in physical form.261 To
date, two potential solutions have been proposed to prevent below-
marginal-cost pricing in the prize system. First, the government
could prohibit an innovator from manufacturing its own inven-
tion. Manufacturing of that product would be left to competitors
in the market, who lack the incentive to sell below marginal
cost.2 62 Challenges in enforcing such a system would include the
need to prevent innovators from indirectly subsidizing consumer
purchases or secretly paying other manufacturers to lower their
prices. Second, the government could prohibit the innovator
from selling its invention at a lower price than its competitors.263
This proposal is based on the assumption that the price charged
by competitors will approximate the true marginal cost and that
anything less is likely underpricing to increase sales volume.264
Of course, the government would need to prevent innovators
from colluding with a competitor to set consumer prices below
marginal cost. However, such enforcement challenges may be
the lesser of the concerns with the two solutions proposed to
date.
The greater concern is that both solutions create a perni-
cious risk of inadvertently increasing the marginal cost of a given
invention for society. As discussed above, innovators typically
have a number of competitive advantages relative to other
firms-such as trade secrecy and know-how-that make them
the most efficient producer of their inventions. Prohibiting the
innovator from manufacturing its invention, or competing on
260 See Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identi-
fying and Measuring Market Power, 61 Antitrust L J 3, 5 (1992).
261 See Louis Kaplow and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in Polinski and Shavell, eds, 2
Handbook of Law and Economics 1073, 1088 (cited in note 32):
Marginal cost... may be more difficult to measure, due both to difficulties in
identifying which costs are variable (and over what time period) and to the
presence of common costs that may be difficult to allocate appropriately. In
part for this reason, the empirical industrial organization literature ... often
treats marginal cost as unobservable.
262 See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 540 n 35 (cited in note 10).
263 See id; Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 16 (cited in note 19).
264 See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 540 n 35 (cited in note 10) ('The
government could prevent such strategic increases in [quantity sold] by forbidding the
innovator from selling below the competitive price."); Hollis and Pogge, The Health Im-
pact Fund at 16 (cited in note 19) (proposing that the government set consumer prices to
approximate marginal cost, because otherwise an innovator "might give the product
away in the hopes of increasing its reward').
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price, will systematically preclude these competitive advantages
from being reflected in measurements of marginal cost. Since
competitive advantages typically lower marginal costs, a rise in
the marginal costs of inventions may be the perverse effect of
either of the proposed solutions for preventing below-marginal-
cost pricing.
If the government cannot prevent innovators from pricing
below marginal cost, the prize literature notes that the govern-
ment might need to intervene and try to set prices at marginal
cost directly.265 However, when the government sets the consumer
price directly, it forgoes what is generally considered to be the
primary benefit of the prize system-the use of market competi-
tion to drive down consumer prices toward marginal cost. The
result is a system that benefits from neither the ability of pa-
tents to reveal consumers' willingness to pay, nor the ability of
prizes to move consumer prices toward marginal cost through
market competition.
C. Conclusion
It should not be taken for granted that consumer prices un-
der a prize system would be superior to those resulting from
normal monopoly pricing strategies in an intellectual property
system. A substantial portion of the deadweight loss associated
with patents can be, and sometimes already is, eliminated by
market forces and governments working within an intellectual
property system, through tools like price discrimination and
government subsidies or price controls. Moreover, eliminating
patents would yield limited benefit when the introduction of
price competition to the market for an innovation is prevented
from lowering consumer prices by other forces. A prize system
may even make things worse by increasing the marginal cost of
certain inventions to the public. In most situations, switching to
a prize system would probably reduce overall deadweight loss to
some extent, but the magnitude of the welfare gain from elimi-
nating intellectual property is likely much smaller than
265 The only proposal in the prize literature that explicitly calls for the government
to set prices at marginal cost appears to be Professors Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge's
Health Impact Fund. Not surprisingly, the proposal dropped the requirement that firms
give up their intellectual property rights in exchange for the government payment. Hollis
and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 16 (cited in note 19). In other words, their pro-
posal ceased to be a prize system-at least insofar as prizes are defined as an alternative
to intellectual property.
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expected in a number of cases. In these cases, the government's
tools for working within the intellectual property system to
reduce deadweight loss may prove more cost-efficient and, in
certain circumstances, more effective.
IV. REVISITING THE HOPE OF SUPERIOR INCENTIVES FOR
INNOVATION
The other, more recently identified advantage of the prize
system is the supposedly superior incentives it offers for innova-
tion. However, even assuming that the government could set a
better reward for innovation than that provided by monopoly
profits, this observation does not justify eliminating intellectual
property in favor of prizes. As explained below, intellectual
property rights do not prevent the government from intervening
in the market to adjust the incentives for innovation. To the ex-
tent that the government can offer superior incentives for inno-
vation in a prize system, it could just as easily offer those same
superior incentives without eliminating intellectual property,
usually through very similar mechanisms as proposed by prize ad-
vocates. Moreover, eliminating intellectual property may remove
an important safeguard against suboptimal government re-
wards-particularly if the government's payments to innovators
will occur over time and renegotiation in response to new infor-
mation about the social value of the invention is desirable.
A. Reasons for the Proposed Superiority of Incentives in a
Prize System
As discussed in Part II.D, many prize advocates now argue
that the prize system is superior to intellectual property because
it gives the government more direct control to adjust incentives
to reflect social value.266 To the extent that intellectual property
links the incentives for innovation to monopoly profits from con-
sumer sales of inventions in a free market, those incentives are
flawed in several distinct ways. The potential profits from many
socially valuable inventions will be too low, the profits from
developing certain types of socially wasteful and duplicative in-
ventions will be too high, and the profits from many cumulative
innovations will be too low because intellectual property
rights often improperly divide profits between earlier and later
266 See note 145.
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innovators.267 Some prize advocates argue that, given the inade-
quacies of monopoly profits as an incentive for innovation, the
government could easily design superior incentives with prizes,
even if it has only limited information about inventions.268
Other prize advocates argue that the prize system would al-
low the government to provide superior incentives for innovation
because it has better information about the social value of in-
ventions than the market does.269 These scholars often stress the
potential disconnect between the social value of inventions and
consumers' ability to pay for them, arguing that intellectual
property creates incentives for innovations that favor the rich
over the poor.270 For these scholars, prizes are superior to intel-
lectual property because they permit the decoupling of the reward
for innovation from the market forces reflecting consumers' will-
ingness to pay.271
267 See text accompanying notes 135-57.
268 See, for example, Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 545 (cited in note 10).
269 See, for example, William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, A Prize System as a Partial
Solution to the Health Crisis in the Developing World, in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer,
and Kim Rubenstein, eds, Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law and Access to
Essential Medicines 181, 184 (2010):
The superiority of the government's information concerning the social benefits
of particular innovations gives a prize system an equally clear advantage over
a patent system, under which research-and-development investments are di-
rected toward lines of innovation that private firms consider most potentially
lucrative, not those that are most socially beneficial. Specifically, a govern-
ment, relying on its superior knowledge, can construct and administer a prize
system in ways that correct for all three of the biases . . . that distort (from a
social welfare standpoint) the output of new pharmaceutical products under
the current patent-based system: the bias toward drugs aimed at ailments
that disproportionately afflict the rich; the bias toward "me-too drugs" (the
term conventionally used to describe drugs that, when introduced into the
market, offer little or no health benefits over extant drugs); and the bias away
from vaccines.
270 See, for example, Fisher, Promises to Keep at 234 (cited in note 16); Stiglitz, 57
Duke L J at 1720-21 (cited in note 8); Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 978-79 (cited in
note 6):
In an IP system, price influences not only who has access to such goods, but also
which goods are produced in the first place. As long as the rich and the poor
sometimes have different needs, as they demonstrably do, a system based on
price will prioritize the needs of the wealthy. Moreover, some information
goods may be of such foundational importance to human freedoms and capabil-
ities that all should have them regardless of their preferences. Because price
necessarily tracks preferences, it is a particularly problematic way to develop
and distribute these kinds of basic information goods.
271 See Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1553 (cited in note 16) (referring to
"decoupling the rewards for successful R&D investment from the sales of products"
through prize-based models).
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In both cases, the unstated assumption of prize advocates is
that the government must eliminate intellectual property rights
in order to adjust the incentives for innovation away from the
baseline of monopoly profits. As Professor Kapczynski explains,
"[u]nlike patents, prizes make it possible to dissociate incentives
from market signals."272
These arguments reflect a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of intellectual property rights. Patents provide
firms with the right to exclude others from making, using, and
selling their claimed invention. 273 Copyrights provide authors
with the right to exclude others from reproducing, adapting, dis-
tributing, and publicly displaying their works of authorship.274
These legal entitlements are monopoly rights, but, contrary to
the standard assumption in the prize literature, they do not give
firms the right to monopoly profits from their inventions.75 The
government is free to limit firms' rights to sell their inventions,
control prices, and intervene in the market in countless other
ways that will affect the profits from these inventions.
Governments already employ a number of tools to adjust or,
in the case of price controls, disregard market signals in setting
the incentives for innovation without eliminating intellectual
property. Governments can directly tax or subsidize an innova-
tor's profits,276 give supplement prizes,27 impose a sales tax or
offer tax credits on the purchase of innovations,278 institute price
controls,279 issue vouchers to consumers with low purchasing
power, 280 or even purchase innovations directly at a price that
272 Kapczynski, 37 J L Med & Ethics at 265 (cited in note 16) ("In fact, the ability to
dissociate incentives from the market is both the promise and the peril of a prize
scheme.").
273 See 35 USC § 271(a).
274 See Gorman and Ginsburg, Copyright: Cases and Materials at 38 (cited in note 40).
275 See note 226.
276 See note 229 and accompanying text.
277 For example, the United States now offers supplemental prizes to firms that de-
velop drugs for neglected tropical diseases, giving them a transferable "priority review
voucher" that entitles its holder to an expedited FDA review of any drug of its choice. See
Henry G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley, and Jeffrey L. Moe, Encouraging Innovative
Treatment of Neglected Diseases through Priority Review Vouchers, in Karen Eggleston,
ed, Prescribing Cultures and Pharmaceutical Policy in the Asia-Pacific 347, 347 (Stan-
ford 2009).
278 See notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
279 See notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
280 The most common targeted consumer subsidy may be Medicaid prescription drug
insurance, which increases the incentive to develop treatments for disabilities-like
schizophrenia-that disproportionately affect people with (or cause them to have) low
purchasing power.
1064 [81:999
Intellectual Property versus Prizes
alters the innovator's profits.281 Indeed, any change in the re-
ward for innovation brought about through a prize system could
be descriptively recast as a tax or subsidy targeted at innovators
with intellectual property rights.
In light of the government's broad powers to adjust the
incentives for innovation while maintaining intellectual property,
it is unclear how switching to a prize system improves the design
or implementation of the rewards for innovation. Advocates of
prizes sometimes cite "more freedom to design incentives effi-
ciently"2s2 and "the greater flexibility in tailoring that prizes af-
ford" as advantages.283 Presumably this refers to the fact that
eliminating intellectual property would force the government to
consider whether the best measure of social value is consumers'
willingness to pay.
Eliminating intellectual property in favor of prizes would ef-
fectively remove the market signals from consumers' willingness
to pay, which might be seen as the default mechanism for set-
ting incentives. However, it is the default mechanism only in the
absence of further government involvement to adjust those in-
centives. As discussed in Part II, governments can and do exer-
cise broad powers to adjust those incentives within the patent
system. Eliminating intellectual property creates no new powers,
so it is unclear why switching to prizes would motivate the gov-
ernment to implement more radical change than it already could
right now but chooses not to. Moreover, the information generated
by this default mechanism in an intellectual property system is
281 An interesting use of these tools to alter innovators' profits is found in advance
market commitments (AMCs). With an AMC, the government layers price subsidies on
top of intellectual property rights to supplement the early revenues from an invention in
exchange for the innovator's agreement to allow generics into the market for the inven-
tion at an earlier date, ultimately achieving near-marginal-cost pricing to the consumer
in the short-term and the long run. See Heidi Williams, Innovation Inducement Prizes:
Connecting Research to Policy, 31 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 752, 758 (2012) (describing
AMCs for a vaccine against pneumococcal diseases prevalent in developing countries).
282 Love and Hubbard, 18 Annals Health L at 160 (cited in note 19) ("The use of cash
prizes to eliminate legal monopolies for products provides a powerful opportunity to ad-
dress several flaws that plague the current system. In particular, policy makers would
have far more freedom to design incentives efficiently.").
283 Kapczynski, 37 J L Med & Ethics at 266 (cited in note 16):
Another benefit is the greater flexibility in tailoring that prizes afford....
Were we to rationally design a system for government incentives for medical
R&D, we would want to consider the comparative allocations towards projects
such as this (especially since such innovations cannot be protected by patents,
and therefore are at a substantial comparative disadvantage in the market-
place for R&D). A prize approach would permit such flexibility.
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what many prize proposals contemplate generating anyway in
order to set incentives without intellectual property.
If prize advocates are correct that the government can offer
better incentives for innovation through a prize system, then,
almost by definition, the government could implement these
same changes without eliminating intellectual property. Unlike
reductions in deadweight loss attributable to patents, any superior
incentives that can be identified and implemented in a prize sys-
tem can also be identified and implemented within the intellec-
tual property system in almost exactly the same manner. Prize
advocates have failed to show that switching to a prize system
generates any new information or mechanism for setting superior
incentives that cannot be achieved in an intellectual property
system through supplements, subsidies, taxes, government pur-
chases, and other tools available to the government. 8 4 Conse-
quently, the government's ability to improve incentives for inno-
vation is not an affirmative argument in favor of the prize
system.
B. The Option Value of Intellectual Property
Ultimately, the primary difference between the incentives
for innovation offered by prizes and intellectual property may be
that the latter gives innovators leverage in negotiating payment
for their inventions, even when they are negotiating with the
government. The government can control the profits from inno-
vation under both intellectual property and prize systems, but
the leverage provided by intellectual property may act as an im-
portant check on suboptimal government rewards. In both sys-
tems, the government retains the power to set the total incen-
tive without regard to consumers' willingness to pay. However,
in an intellectual property system, the exclusive right to make,
use, and sell an invention enables innovators to deny the public
access to the good if the incentive offered by the government is
too low.285 Of course, an innovator is strongly motivated to accept
any reward, no matter how small, because R & D costs are already
sunk at that point. However, if firms can deny the public access to
their innovations, then they still have some leverage over gov-
ernment officials. If other manufacturers can step in to supply
284 There may be administrative or logistical reasons why it is easier to alter industry
profits in the absence of intellectual property rights, but none has been offered.
285 See note 174.
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the good, innovators must rely entirely on the government's good
graces for their compensation.
The most pressing political economy concern with the prize
system is the risk of inadequate prize payouts and expropria-
tion. When innovators earn their profits through a government-
funded prize system, they are competing against other interest
groups over scarce taxpayer dollars. Innovators are likely to be
at a disadvantage in these types of political battles for three
reasons. First, by nature, innovators often threaten established
interests and therefore create opposition from more powerful in-
terest groups.286 Second, because innovators capture an unusually
small portion of the social surplus generated by their activi-
ties,287 they have proportionally fewer resources to devote to rent
seeking in support of their R & D investments. Third, and most
importantly, innovators are particularly vulnerable to expropri-
ation under a prize system because the government determines
their prize payout after innovators have invested in R & D and
disclosed their inventions to the government. Since innovators'
R & D investments are sunk at this stage, the government can
take advantage of its position to grossly underpay innovators,218
who may have little choice but to accept the insufficient re-
ward.289 Legislators could then redirect funds that would other-
wise incentivize innovation toward lower taxes or other govern-
ment spending programs, many of which would offer more
immediate political gains than payments to innovators meant to
encourage R & D spending.90 Eventually, the public would suf-
fer from the reduced output of socially valuable innovation.
However, this malfeasance would be largely hidden from voters,
since it is nearly impossible to observe the relative absence of
286 See Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent-
Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83 Am Econ Rev 409, 412-13 (May 1993); Stuart Minor
Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 Geo
Wash L Rev 1, 13-14 (2008); William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unpro-
ductive, and Destructive, 98 J Polit Econ 893, 900-01 (1990).
287 See notes 72-84, 142-43, and accompanying text.
288 See DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics at 489
(cited in note 15); Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 399 (cited in note 3) (arguing
that "there is an inherent conservative bias in the prizes granted by administrative
and quasi-judicial bodies"); Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization at 313 (cited in
note 5).
289 See DiMasi and Grabowski, 82 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics at 489
(cited in note 15).
290 See Rai, 2001 U Ill L Rev at 198 (cited in note 107); Jeffrey S. Banks, Linda R.
Cohen, and Roger G. Noll, The Politics of Commercial R&D Programs, in Linda R. Cohen
and Roger G. Noll, eds, The Technology Pork Barrel 53, 55-56, 61-63 (Brookings 1991).
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new innovations.291 Consequently, the risk of expropriation in a
prize system could be a significant deterrent to private-sector
investment in R & D unless there are political checks to prevent
underpayment.
Some prize advocates argue that the government could
avoid the inadequate-funding and expropriation problems by al-
locating a fixed amount of money to a prize agency for payments
to innovators and by requiring the agency to disburse all of that
money.292 This approach could prevent agency officials from de-
ciding to systematically underreward innovators. However, it
would not prevent legislators from underrewarding innovators
by inadequately funding the prize agency. The government has a
long history of underfunding its R & D programs, and govern-
ment support for R & D has been declining as a percentage of
GDP since the mid-1960s.293 The risk that the government will
allocate too little money for innovation is even greater under a
prize system compared to government-funded R & D because,
with prizes, innovators have already sunk their R & D invest-
ments when the government calculates their reward, which
makes innovators susceptible to expropriation. Consequently,
commentators are right to fear that the government would offer
inadequate incentives for innovation under a prize system, even
if the government has good information about the social value of
inventions.
Most prize advocates ultimately propose that the prize
system be optional to avoid the expropriation problem.294 In an
291 See Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses, 2014 Mich St L Rev *28
(forthcoming), online at http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstreamthandle/l/11189865/Solving
%20the%20Problem%20of/o20New%20Uses%20.pdf?sequence=1 (visited Aug 12, 2014).
292 See, for example, Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 125 (cited in note 16):
Congress can eliminate the problem of systematic errors by capping the
amount that the agency may spend. If an agency, for example, can spend $1
billion, then industry will not be able to capture the agency and receive unde-
served funds simply by inducing the agency to make favorable assessments,
because the agency would not be able to spend any more than the congression-
al appropriation.... At the same time, Congress can prevent undercompensa-
tion by requiring that an agency spend whatever it has been appropriated.
See also Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 43-46, 49-50 (cited in note 19).
293 See Roin, 2014 Mich St L Rev at *28-29 (forthcoming) (cited in note 291) (describing
this long-term trend and the underlying political economy problems that are likely
responsible for it).
294 See, for example, Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 226 (cited in note 16); Barry, 2007
Wis L Rev at 619-21 (cited in note 16); Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1139 (cited in note 10);
Mandel, 24 Temple J Sci Tech & Envir L at 64-69 (cited in note 16); Shavell and van Ypersele,
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optional-prize system, the innovator is given a choice between a
prize and an intellectual property right, allowing the firm to de-
cline any prize that is less than what the innovator expects to
earn through a monopoly. This choice can protect innovators
against unduly conservative prizes offered by the government. 95
The check on inadequate government rewards provided by
intellectual property is similar to the imagined operation of an
optional-prize system, in which the innovator has the choice of
accepting either a prize or a patent for its invention. As dis-
cussed in Part I, an optional-prize system deters suboptimal
government rewards by giving the innovator a choice between a
patent and a prize, thereby allowing the innovator to decline any
prize that is less that what it believes the public is willing to
pay.2 96 Governments achieve a similar effect by granting an in-
tellectual property right that will not be consulted in determining
the social value and incentives for an invention. Here also,
suboptimal government rewards are checked by the innovator's
right to decline to sell for anything less than what it believes the
public would be willing to pay. This is true even if the govern-
ment imposes price controls or prohibits sales by the patent
holder to anyone but itself. So long as the innovator has an intel-
lectual property right, it can decline to sell and prevent others
from selling the invention.97 The power to deny the public access
gives the patent holder a platform to challenge a suboptimal
44 J L & Econ at 544 (cited in note 10); Hollis and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 6
(cited in note 19).
295 See Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 544 (cited in note 10):
The optional reward system .... has the practical, political advantage that in-
dustry should not object to it, as it can only raise firms' profits. Moreover, the
fear that the government would act suboptimally, and give unduly conserva-
tive rewards, would be less of an issue under an optional reward scheme be-
cause innovators can always obtain intellectual property rights. Indeed, just
because of innovators' option, the government's temptation to pay too little
might be checked under an optional reward system.
See also Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1139 (cited in note 10) ("As a safeguard against confis-
cation of inventions, patent holders could choose whether to sell their patents."); Barry,
2007 Wis L Rev at 635-38 (cited in note 16). However, optional-prize systems are less
effective when the government can exercise control over the market for the innovation,
as is generally true for innovations related to health care. The Soviet Union's prize system
was technically optional in nature, but because the government controlled the market
and the patentability standards, innovators reportedly had little choice but to accept
whatever prize they were offered. See William van Caenegem, Inventions in Russia:
From Public Good to Private Property, 4 Austl IP J 232, 233 (1993).
296 See note 295 and accompanying text.
297 See note 295 and accompanying text.
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award and motivate the public to lobby the government for a
higher reward if it wants access. 298
Countries that couple nationalized health care and drug pa-
tents provide an example of how this check against suboptimal
government rewards can be achieved by granting intellectual
property that will not be used in determining incentives. As ex-
plained in Part II, these governments continue to grant drug pa-
tents but set the incentives for innovation through a combina-
tion of price controls and reimbursement payments without ever
introducing artificial scarcity to reveal consumers' willingness to
pay.299 The government, as the only buyer of the drug, effectively
sets the incentives when it agrees on reimbursement rates with
the drug company. However, the drug company always has re-
course to decline to sell if the rate offered by the government is
too low. If the drug company makes a compelling case to the
public as to the benefit of the drug, the drug company can effec-
tively motivate the public to lobby the government to increase
the reimbursement rate commensurate with the value assigned
by the public. 300 The process repeats itself every few years since
the contracts are generally set for finite terms to permit renego-
tiation as drug performance and alternative treatments become
known.01
Ultimately, the check against suboptimal government rewards
provided by intellectual property may be superior to the check
that is provided by an optional-prize system under most circum-
stances, since intellectual property allows for the renegotiation
of rewards as new information becomes available regarding an
invention's true value. Intellectual property offers a continuing
check on suboptimal rewards for the life of the monopoly right,
whereas the optional-prize system offers the check only at the
initial decision between patent and prize.302 When a continuing
check on suboptimal rewards (and the renegotiations it makes
possible) is important, society may prefer to grant intellectual
property rights (though not intending to use them in determin-
ing incentives) instead of switching to either an optional- or
298 Of course, the innovator would be strongly incentivized to accept the proposed
reward because its R & D investments would be sunk at that time.
299 See note 183 and accompanying text.
300 See notes 183, 231,.and accompanying text.
301 See note 183 and accompanying text.
302 In an optional-prize system, after the decision to accept a prize is made, the in-
novator loses all leverage to deny the public access because the innovator has no power
to stop other firms from selling the invention.
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mandatory-prize system. This would be the case even if we as-
sume that the government would set equally optimal incentives
for innovation without intellectual property.
Accordingly, the loss of a safeguard against suboptimal gov-
ernment rewards for innovation can justify not switching from
intellectual property to prizes, notwithstanding that equivalent
incentives for innovation could be set without intellectual prop-
erty. By providing innovators with intellectual property rights,
the government limits its own ability to expropriate socially val-
uable innovations. Although an optional-prize system provides a
similar check, intellectual property rights are superior if the
government wants its payments to reflect changes in the esti-
mated social value of the invention over time, or if it wants inno-
vators to have ongoing incentives to increase the value of their
inventions. This is the reason overlooked in existing scholarship
for not switching to prizes even if the government can set prize
payouts that are no worse than intellectual property at promot-
ing innovation. If the anticipated reduction in deadweight loss from
eliminating patents is not substantial-which will often be true if
the government is (or can) subsidizing consumer purchases-then
switching to prizes may be the wrong choice because it means for-
going a safeguard against suboptimal incentives for innovation.
C. Conclusion
Replacing patents with prizes does not offer any superior in-
centives for innovation that are unavailable to the government
through existing tools such as subsidies, taxes, and government
purchases. Intellectual property provides the government with
one measure of social value-consumers' willingness to pay-
which it retains full discretion to disregard in setting the incen-
tives for innovation. Eliminating intellectual property removes
that source of information (thereby preventing its use as a de-
fault measure of social value). However, it does not offer any
new mechanism or information for setting superior incentives
that can be accessed only by eliminating patents. Ironically,
replacing patents with prizes may offer inferior incentives for
innovation by eliminating a previously overlooked check on
suboptimal government rewards provided by intellectual
property. Thus, unlike reductions in deadweight loss from pa-
tents, improved incentives for innovation are not an advantage
of a prize system that weighs in favor of eliminating intellectual
property; indeed, this factor may weigh against it.
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V. REVISION OF THE UNIFYING THEME
A key premise in the prize literature is that, if the govern-
ment could offer prizes that provide the same (or better) incen-
tives for innovation as intellectual property, then it should use
prizes because they avoid the deadweight loss from monopoly
pricing.303 A growing number of scholars also argue that prizes
are better than intellectual property because the government
would set prize payouts to provide superior incentives for inno-
vation. 304 Much of the academic literature on prizes focuses on
the singular question whether the government can determine
prize payouts for innovations that are no worse than intellectual
property at promoting innovation-assuming that if the answer
is yes, the government should eliminate intellectual property. 305
This Article shows that this well-established framework for
comparing intellectual property with prizes is flawed. Assuming
that prize advocates are correct in their claims about the bene-
fits of replacing intellectual property with prizes, most or all of
those gains frequently can be accomplished through analogous
policy interventions without eliminating intellectual property.
The promised reductions in deadweight loss from switching to
prizes will often be lower than anticipated because those com-
parisons have ignored reductions in deadweight loss already
achieveable without eliminating patents through price discrimi-
nation and subsidies. The promised reductions will also be less
than anticipated because the comparisons have ignored forces
that often prevent consumer prices (and therefore deadweight
loss) from falling when intellectual property is eliminated. The
ability of the prize system to offer superior incentives for innova-
tion will not bear out because it is based on a false comparison
with a patent system devoid of tools such as subsidies, taxes,
and government purchases, which are already used by govern-
ments to freely adjust incentives. While eliminating intellectual
property may make it easier to conceptualize incentives divorced
from consumers' willingness to pay, it provides no additional in-
formation or mechanism that is unavailable to the government
without eliminating patents.
303 See note 116 and accompanying text.
304 See note 132 and accompanying text.
305 Indeed, recent scholarship on the prize system focuses almost exclusively on the
question of how the government could establish appropriate rewards. See, for example,
Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 128-58 (cited in note 16); Barry, 2007 Wis L Rev at 630-
35 (cited in note 16); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi Kent L Rev at 1528-34 (cited in note 16).
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These insights suggest that there is much less at stake in
the choice between intellectual property and prizes than cur-
rently assumed in the prize literature. The benefit of avoiding
deadweight loss needs to be measured as the amount of incre-
mental gains achieved by eliminating patents, which may be
relatively small given the various tools available to the govern-
ment for mitigating deadweight loss within the intellectual
property system. Moreover, because those same tools also allow
the government to adjust the incentives for innovation, many of
the insights in the prize literature about how to improve those
incentives could be implemented without a radical (and politically
controversial) change to the intellectual property system.
Perhaps more importantly, this Article argues that the ex-
isting scholarship has overlooked a potentially large loss that
would come from eliminating patents in favor of prizes, even
when the patent is not needed to set equally optimal incentives
for innovation at the outset. As discussed in Part III, the gov-
ernment has the option of maintaining intellectual property but
setting the incentives for innovation without consulting the patent,
just as in a prize system. In this scenario, the only difference
currently identified in the prize scholarship is that the prize sys-
tem, unlike the intellectual property system, can reduce
deadweight loss through price competition (and, some argue,
provide superior incentives). The difference that has been over-
looked until now is that the intellectual property system in this
scenario, unlike the prize system, allows the government to ad-
just its payments to innovators over time to reflect new infor-
mation about the social value of inventions, while still maintain-
ing a check against expropriation. The loss of that check must be
weighed against the potential gains (if any) of eliminating pa-
tents through reductions in deadweight loss. This disadvantage
to eliminating intellectual property may explain why govern-
ments have continued granting drug patents even when they di-
rectly control the incentives for innovation.
The arguments outlined in Parts III and IV demonstrate
that the current framework for comparing intellectual property
with prizes is incomplete. Once prize advocates overcome the in-
itial hurdle of showing that the government can set the initial
payment for inventions that provide equal or superior incentives
for innovation as intellectual property, those advocates must
address two additional questions to make the case for eliminat-
ing intellectual property. First, they must address whether
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intellectual property is necessary for checking inadequate gov-
ernment rewards. Second, they must evaluate the incremental
gains achieved by eliminating intellectual property in moving
consumer prices closer to marginal cost. The following questions
will be relevant to these inquiries.
A. Do Innovators Need an Ongoing Check against Suboptimal
Rewards?
The benefits of switching to prizes will be reduced to the ex-
tent that society values an ongoing safeguard against subopti-
mal government rewards. In many cases, the government will
want to offer continuing payments that can be changed over
time rather than a lump sum or fixed payment. Reasons for this
might be that estimates of the invention's value may change
significantly over time, or that the government wants to provide
continuing incentives for investment by the innovator to in-
crease the social value of the invention. When that is the case,
eliminating intellectual property is problematic, because the in-
novator potentially needs an ongoing monopoly right to prevent
the government from providing inadequate rewards in subse-
quent renegotiations. These concerns are more pressing if gov-
ernment officials would be pressured to divert money away from
innovators in favor of other programs without the public losing
access to the invention. On the other hand, these concerns may
be outweighed if innovators will be able to extract excessive
rents from the government in the course of renegotiations. In
that case, this safeguard against unduly conservative rewards
may be a liability, making prizes the better system.
B. Is Marginal Cost Reasonably Observable?
The gains from eliminating intellectual property in favor of
prizes will be less when an invention's marginal price is readily
identifiable to the government without price competition. One of
the key benefits of the prize system is its ability to inform con-
sumer prices by allowing firms to compete on price. When that
competition is not necessary to reveal marginal price, the gov-
ernment could intervene directly by using price controls, reim-
bursement payments, or subsidies for consumer purchases.
When the government can observe marginal costs, it can use
these tools to achieve efficient pricing without abolishing intel-
lectual property. Examples of goods for which marginal cost
can be easily observed include nearly all inventions that can be
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reproduced and distributed as digital files-for example, music,
films, books, and software.306 In these cases, in which the consumer-
price-discovery function of prizes is not needed, the benefits of
eliminating patents in favor of prizes will be smaller.
C. Will Eliminating Intellectual Property Bring Consumer
Prices Close to Marginal Cost?
The gains from replacing intellectual property with prizes
will also be less when the introduction of price competition in the
market for an invention is prevented from lowering consumer
prices by other forces. Regulatory barriers to entry, trade se-
crets, and know-how all continue after the elimination of intel-
lectual property, insulating the innovator from price competition
that would lower consumer prices. Large fixed costs of produc-
tion and economies of scale can similarly prevent consumer prices
from falling to marginal costs. In these cases, the government
may be able to set prices closer to marginal cost than can be
achieved through increased price competition attributable to the
elimination of intellectual property.
The market for medical treatments provides an example of a
scenario in which the price competition made possible by elimi-
nating intellectual property will be hindered in lowering con-
sumer prices by other forces. The large fixed costs of manufac-
turing drugs, including building facilities and obtaining the
necessary certifications, will cause the generic price of drugs to
remain noticeably higher than marginal cost. 307 Likewise, in the
market for vaccines and biologic drugs, in which the regulatory
barriers to entry will block most competition, price controls or
subsidies might be the only way to offer access to the public at
close to marginal cost.308 When price competition cannot succeed
in lowering consumer prices to marginal cost, switching to a
prize system may not dramatically increase the public's access
to drugs.
D. Can the Government Police Below-Marginal-Cost Pricing?
The benefits from switching to prizes will be reduced when
the government has difficulty measuring and policing innovators
that inflate their sales figures or sell their goods below marginal
306 See note 248 and accompanying text.
307 See notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
308 See notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
2014] 1075
1076 The University of Chicago Law Review [81:999
cost. Innovators will have an incentive to do both when prize
payouts are based on sales volume, as is the case with most
prize proposals.309 Accordingly, the government cannot rely on
the innovator self-reporting sales volume or marginal cost.
However, the government is not necessarily well-suited to
provide the necessary monitoring and enforcement of innova-
tors. In many cases, no regulatory infrastructure exists for the
government to monitor consumers' usage, 10 or manufacturers'
distribution and production,311 of an invention.32 In other cases,
the government would have to take on additional enforcement
functions that are currently filled by market participants. The
patent system relies on inventors to monitor the usage of their
own creations and uses an adversarial process to resolve any
disputes about whether one firm is actually using another's
patented invention.313 In the prize system, in which the govern-
ment is paying the prize, other firms will have less reason to po-
lice and dispute the exaggerated reports of a competitor.
The pharmaceutical industry is an example of an industry
in which the government already has a regulatory structure in
place that could be used to monitor sales volume and marginal
cost of prescription drugs. 314 The administrative costs of the
309 See notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
310 See Kapczynski and Syed, 122 Yale L J at 1926-27 (cited in note 14).
311 Marginal cost is notoriously difficult to measure for inventions that are manufac-
tured and distributed in physical form, as is the case with most inventions. See notes
260-62 and accompanying text.
312 For example, if the government wanted to know the sales figures for inventions
like light-emitting diodes (LED lights) or compression algorithms that reduce the size of
digital files, it is unclear what regulatory infrastructure could be co-opted, and a new
oversight regime may be the most cost-effective option. Of course, in some cases, the gov-
ernment might be able to directly monitor consumers (or at least a representative group
of consumers) to determine how often people are using an invention, as Professor Wil-
liam Fisher proposed for the implementation of a prize system for music and films. See
Fisher, Promises to Keep at 223-29 (cited in note 16).
313 See Kieff, 85 Minn L Rev at 712-17 (cited in note 11) (discussing the screening
function that patents perform in determining which inventors should be rewarded and
what the size of their reward should be).
314 In this regard, the pharmaceutical industry is unusual in that the government
strictly oversees the channels through which prescription drugs are distributed and sold.
See generally Richard R. Abood, Pharmacy Practice and the Law (Jones & Bartlett 7th
ed 2012) (discussing the various federal and state laws in the United States that regu-
late the dispensing of medication and pharmacy practice). Due to this existing regulatory
structure, the prize literature usually assumes that the government could measure drug
sales with reasonable accuracy. See, for example, Grinols and Henderson, 25 Pharmaco-
economics at 356 (cited in note 15); Fisher and Syed, Prizes at *15 (cited in note 16); Hollis
and Pogge, The Health Impact Fund at 29 (cited in note 19); Love and Hubbard, 82 Chi
Kent L Rev at 1539 (cited in note 16).
Intellectual Property versus Prizes
infrastructure may be significant, but likely are not overwhelm-
ing.315 The greater concern in this case would be the need for the
government to undertake enforcement roles that are currently
filled by market participants. Under a prize system in which
payouts are based on sales volume for drugs, the government
would need to take on the insurance companies' role of discour-
aging excessive prescribing. Drug companies use a variety of
marketing tools to promote the use of their drugs, some of which
can result in excessive prescribing.316 Insurance companies have
a number of seemingly successful techniques to discourage phy-
sicians from prescribing patented drugs when they are not the
most cost-effective treatment.317 While the government already
does some policing of excessive prescribing,318 there is evidence
suggesting that government efforts have resulted in substantial
distortionary effects39 that private insurance companies would
be incentivized to avoid.
E. Is Marginal Cost the Socially Optimal Consumer Price?
Finally, the gains from switching to a prize system will be
less when the invention is expected to be offered at something
other than marginal cost. There are a number of reasons why
society may prefer consumer prices to differ from marginal cost.
Many of them are illustrated in prescription drug insurance that
sets co-pays (that is, consumer prices) at a price other than mar-
ginal cost. For example, consumers may prefer to pay less than
marginal cost to offset the loss from an adverse health event, or
more than marginal cost to discourage unnecessary consumption
for moral hazard reasons. Given the various cross-price elastici-
ties between drugs, diagnostics, medical devices, and medical
315 See Abood, Pharmacy Practice at 285-92 (cited in note 314).
316 See Angell, The Truth about the Drug Companies at 126-30 (cited in note 194).
317 See Jaume Puig-Junoy and Ivdn Moreno-Torres, Impact of Pharmaceutical Prior
Authorisation Policies: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 25 Pharmacoeconomics
637, 638-39 (2007); Stuart 0. Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy 82-97
(Oxford 2d ed 2007) (discussing the marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies
and how managed care organizations have used formularies and other tools to control
physician prescribing practices).
318 For example, the government employs techniques similar to those used by insur-
ance companies to control physicians prescribing under Medicare. See Peter B. Bach,
Limits on Medicare's Ability to Control Rising Spending on Cancer Drugs, 360 New Eng
J Med 626, 626-27, 629 (2009).
319 See Mark Duggan and Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Distortionary Effects of Gov-
ernment Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing, 121 Q J
Econ 1, 23-24 (2006).
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services, optimal co-pays will frequently differ from marginal
cost.320 When the optimal consumer price is something other
than marginal cost, the greater precision in setting consumer
prices that is made possible by the prize system will be less rele-
vant. In these cases, eliminating patents in favor of prizes may
offer little gain to society.
CONCLUSION
The consensus view is that if the government can set prizes
that offer equivalent incentives for innovation as intellectual
property, it should grant prizes instead of intellectual property
because the public would receive the same benefits of innovation
without the deadweight loss from higher consumer prices. This
can no longer be taken for granted. Assuming that the government
can set equally good incentives for innovation without patents, it
might want to eliminate intellectual property rights, but it
might also want to issue those rights with supplemental prizes
and price controls or consumer subsidies. The comparison between
the two approaches depends on the projected gains that can be
achieved from reductions in deadweight loss. The comparison also
depends on the value to society of a perpetual safeguard against
suboptimal government incentives and the capacity for periodic
renegotiation that it makes possible.
320 See Dana Goldman and Tomas J. Philipson, Integrated Insurance Design in the
Presence of Multiple Medical Technologies, 97 Am Econ Rev 427, 430 (2007).
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